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Abstract
In failure-time settings, a competing risk event is any event that makes it impossible for the
event of interest to occur. For example, cardiovascular disease death is a competing event for
prostate cancer death because an individual cannot die of prostate cancer once he has died of
cardiovascular disease. Various statistical estimands have been defined as possible targets of in-
ference in the classical competing risks literature. Many reviews have described these statistical
estimands and their estimating procedures with recommendations about their use. However,
this previous work has not used a formal framework for characterizing causal effects and their
identifying conditions, which makes it difficult to interpret effect estimates and assess recom-
mendations regarding analytic choices. Here we use a counterfactual framework to explicitly
define each of these classical estimands. We clarify that, depending on whether competing events
are defined as censoring events, contrasts of risks can define a total effect of the treatment on
the event of interest, or a direct effect of the treatment on the event of interest not mediated
through the competing event. In contrast, regardless of whether competing events are defined
as censoring events, counterfactual hazard contrasts cannot generally be interpreted as causal
effects. We illustrate how identifying assumptions for all of these counterfactual estimands can
be represented in causal diagrams in which competing events are depicted as time-varying co-
variates. We present an application of these ideas to data from a randomized trial designed to
estimate the effect of estrogen therapy on prostate cancer mortality.
1 Introduction
In failure-time settings, a competing risk event is any event that makes it impossible for the event
of interest to occur. For example, death from cardiovascular disease is a competing event for
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death from prostate cancer because an individual cannot die of prostate cancer once he has died of
cardiovascular disease. Because competing events cannot be prevented by design, they can occur
in both randomized and nonrandomized studies.
Various statistical estimands have been defined as possible targets of inference in the classical
literature on competing risks in failure-time settings. As recently summarized by Geskus 2016, these
include the so-called marginal cumulative incidence (alternatively, net risk), cause-specific cumula-
tive incidence (alternatively, subdistribution function or crude risk), marginal hazard, subdistribu-
tion hazard, and cause-specific hazard[Geskus, 2016, Fine and Gray, 1999, Kalbfleisch and Prentice,
1980]. Many reviews describe these statistical estimands and their estimating procedures Gooley et al.
[1999], Pintilie [2007], Latouche et al. [2007], Wolbers and Koller [2007], Andersen et al. [2012],
Lau et al. [2015], Edwards et al. [2016], Geskus [2016]. Early authors also considered the interpre-
tation of these estimands[Chiang, 1961, 1970] with others providing recommendations about their
use [Lau et al., 2015, Austin et al., 2016, Geskus, 2016, Latouche et al., 2013]. However, this pre-
vious work has not used a formal framework for characterizing causal effects and their identifying
conditions, which makes it difficult to interpret the effect estimates from these procedures and to
assess recommendations regarding analytic choices.
Here we use a counterfactual framework [Robins, 1986, Pearl, 2000] to explicitly define each
of these classical statistical estimands, which results in two different counterfactual definitions of
risk and three different counterfactual definitions of hazard. We clarify that contrasts of risks can
define a total effect of the treatment on the event of interest, or a direct effect of the treatment on
the event of the interest that is not mediated through the competing event. A key distinction be-
tween these definitions of causal effect is whether competing events are defined as censoring events.
In contrast, regardless of whether competing events are defined as censoring events, contrasts of
hazards cannot generally be interpreted as causal effects. We also show how, contrary to previ-
ous claims [Lesko and Lau, 2017], identifying assumptions for all of these counterfactual estimands
can be represented in causal diagrams [Pearl, 1995, Richardson and Robins, 2013] in which the
competing event is depicted as a time-varying covariate.
The manuscript is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the longitudinal observed
data structure of interest. In Section 3, we give counterfactual definitions of classical statistical
estimands in failure-time settings and define causal effects when competing events do not exist.
In Section 4, we give counterfactual definitions of classical estimands and definitions of total and
direct effects when competing events exist. In Section 5, we provide assumptions under which these
counterfactual estimands may be identified, illustrate how causal diagrams may be used to evaluate
these assumptions, and show that the identifying functions constitute special cases of Robins’s g-
formula1986. In Section 6 we consider how to choose between different definitions of causal effect
when competing events exist. In Section 7, we outline various estimators of total and direct effects
based on various algebraically equivalent representations of the g-formula. In Section 8, we present
an application of these ideas to data from a randomized trial designed to estimate the effect of
estrogen therapy on prostate cancer mortality. In Section 9, we provide a discussion, including
brief consideration of so-called cross-world counterfactual alternatives to our definition of a direct
effect when competing events exist.
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2 Observed data structure
Consider a randomized trial in which each of i = 1, . . . , n individuals with prostate cancer are
randomly assigned to either treatment A = 1 (estrogen therapy) or A = 0 (placebo) at baseline.
Individuals are assumed independent and identically distributed and thus we suppress an individual-
specific i subscript. Let k = 0, . . . ,K + 1 denote equally spaced follow-up intervals (e.g., months)
with interval k = 0 corresponding to baseline and interval k = K+1 corresponding to the maximum
follow-up of interest (e.g., 60 months post-baseline). Let Ck, Dk and Yk denote indicators of loss
to follow-up, a competing event (e.g., death from cardiovascular disease) and the event of interest
(e.g., death from prostate cancer) by interval k, respectively. By definition C0 ≡ D0 ≡ Y0 ≡ 0
because no individual has been lost to follow-up or has yet experienced the event of interest or the
competing event at baseline.
For k > 0, let Lk denote a vector of time-varying individual characteristics measured in in-
terval k (e.g., indicator of a nonfatal cardiovascular event, indicator of treatment nonadherence)
with baseline covariates L0 (e.g. baseline physical activity level, baseline age, history of cardio-
vascular disease) measured before assignment to treatment A. We assume the temporal ordering
(Ck,Dk, Yk, Lk) within each follow-up interval k > 0. For simplicity, we also assume that all
variables are measured without error.
We denote the history of a random variable using overbars, e.g., Y k = (Y0, . . . , Yk) is the
history of the event of interest through interval k. We denote the future of a random variable
through the follow-up of interest using underbars, e.g., Y k+1 = (Yk+1, . . . , YK+1). If an individual
is lost to follow-up by k > 0 (Ck = 1) then all future indicators for both the event of interest
(all components of Y k) and the competing event (all components of Dk) will be unobserved. By
contrast, if an individual is known to experience the competing event by interval k > 0 without
history of the event of interest (Yk−1 = 0,Dk = 1) then all future indicators for the event of interest
(Y k) will be observed and deterministically zero because, by definition, individuals who experience
a competing event can never subsequently experience the event of interest.
3 Counterfactual estimands when competing events do not exist
Suppose we are interested in the causal effect of (assignment to) treatment A on the event of
interest. In this section we begin with the simplified case in which competing events do not exist,
i.e. DK+1 ≡ 0, which will occur when death from any cause is the event of interest. In the next
section, we consider the more general case in which competing events exist, which will occur when
death from prostate cancer is the event of interest and death from another cause (e.g., cardiovascular
disease) is a competing event.
To define the causal effect when competing events do not exist, we first need to define the coun-
terfactual (or potential) outcome variables Y ak+1 for a = 0, 1 and k = 0, ...K. For each individual,
Y ak+1 is the indicator of the event of interest by interval k+1 if the individual, possibly contrary to
fact, had been assigned to A = a. In a study without loss to follow-up, i.e., CK+1 ≡ 0, Y
a
K+1 will
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be observed for all individuals with A = a and unobserved for individuals with A 6= a. We define
the counterfactual risk of the event of interest by k + 1 had all individuals in the population been
assigned A = a as Pr[Y ak+1 = 1], k = 0, . . . ,K. The average causal effect of treatment A on the
event of interest by k + 1 can then be defined by Pr[Y a=1k+1 = 1] − [Pr[Y
a=0
k+1 = 1]. More generally,
the population-level causal effect of treatment A on the event of interest by k + 1 can be defined
as Pr[Y a=1k+1 = 1] vs. [Pr[Y
a=0
k+1 = 1], even on a non-additive (e.g. ratio) scale.
In most studies, some individuals are lost to follow-up. In this case, we might alternatively define
the counterfactual outcome for time k + 1 Y a,c=0k+1 , which is the indicator of the event of interest
that would have been observed under a in the absence of loss to follow-up. This counterfactual
outcome is indexed by both a and c = 0, where c = 0 represents a hypothetical intervention that
eliminates loss to follow-up [Herna´n and Robins, 2018]. We will generally define a censoring event
as any event such that, if an individual experiences that event, we are prevented from observing
the counterfactual outcome of interest under any level of a for that individual. Therefore, loss to
follow-up is a censoring event because, for an individual who is lost to follow-up by k + 1, we are
prevented from observing Y a,c=0k+1 for any level of a. Then the counterfactual risk by k + 1 for any
k = 0, . . . ,K
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1] (1)
is the risk that would have been observed if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and
we had somehow eliminated loss to follow-up.
For this definition of the counterfactual outcome, the average causal effect of treatment A on
the event of interest by k + 1 is
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1]− Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1]. (2)
such that the treatment A has a nonnull average causal effect on the event of interest by k + 1
if and only if Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1] 6= Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1]. Under the assumption that being lost to
follow-up does not affect any individual’s future outcomes, then Y a,c=0k+1 = Y
a
k+1 for all individuals
and (2) quantifies a total effect, capturing all causal pathways between treatment A and the event
of interest. We will make this assumption throughout. Under failure of this assumption, (2) is
more precisely understood as the treatment’s direct effect on the event of interest not mediated by
loss to follow-up.
We can analogously define the discrete-time hazard of the event of interest in interval k + 1
under a and no loss to follow-up as
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,c=0
k = 0] (3)
We will refer to (3) as a discrete-time hazard regardless of whether the underlying counterfactual
failure time is discrete or continuous. That is, defining T a,c=0 as the counterfactual time to failure
from the event of interest under an intervention that sets A to a and eliminates loss to follow-up, we
can equivalently write (3) as Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (tk, tk+1]|T
a,c=0 > tk] with interval k defined by (tk, tk+1].
This is a discrete-time hazard when T a,c=0 is discrete with support at tk+1, k = 0, . . . ,K. The limit
of this function as interval-length approaches zero divided by interval length is the continuous-time
hazard function when T a,c=0 is continuous.
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Unlike the risk (1), the hazard (3) is conditional on survival to k, which may be affected by
treatment A (for k > 0). Therefore, Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1|Y
a=1,c=0
k = 0] 6= Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1|Y
a=0,c=0
k =
0] does not necessarily imply that A has a nonnull causal effect at k+1. The hazards at k+1 may
differ just because of differences in individuals who survive until k under a = 1 versus a = 0 due to
treatment effects before k [Herna´n et al., 2004, Herna´n, 2010]. For this reason, unlike the contrast
in counterfactual risks (2), we generally cannot interpret contrasts in counterfactual hazards
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1|Y
a=1,c=0
k = 0] vs. Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1|Y
a=0,c=0
k = 0] (4)
as causal effects even though they may be precisely defined contrasts of counterfactual quantities
and may even be identifiable from the study data [Flanders and Klein, 2015]. See also Section 5.3.
Remark: Our definition of a censoring event – an event that precludes observation of the coun-
terfactual outcome of interest under any level of a – is consistent with definitions of right-censoring
of a failure time in the classical survival analysis literature: if Y a,c=0k+1 is unobserved due to a cen-
soring event, then the failure time T a,c=0 will be right-censored. On the other hand, reaching the
administrative end of the study, resulting in so-called administrative (right-) censoring of the failure
time T a,c=0, does not result in censoring of Y a,c=0k+1 at any k < K+1 at or before the administrative
end of the study.
4 Counterfactual estimands when competing events exist
When competing events exist, the counterfactual outcomes—and therefore risks and hazards—can
be defined in different ways. In this section, we describe various counterfactual definitions of risk
and hazard of the event of interest when competing events exist and map these to estimands that
have been defined in the classical statistical literature (see Table 1). We also give an interpretation
of contrasts in these counterfactual estimands under different interventions on treatment A.
4.1 Direct effects
For k = 0, . . . ,K, consider the counterfactual outcome Y a,c=d=0k+1 where d = 0 represents a hypothet-
ical intervention that eliminates the competing event. For this choice of counterfactual outcome,
competing events are censoring events because, for an individual who experiences a competing event
by k+1, we are prevented from observing Y a,c=d=0k+1 for any level of a. Then the counterfactual risk
by k + 1 under a
Pr[Y a,c=d=0k+1 = 1] (5)
is the risk that would have been observed if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and we
had somehow eliminated both losses to follow-up and competing events. This risk under elimination
of competing events has been referred to as the marginal cumulative incidence or net risk in the
statistics literature [Geskus, 2016].
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Table 1: Definitions, descriptions and terminology for different counterfactual risks and hazards of the event of interest when
competing events exist under an intervention that sets A to a and eliminates losses to follow-up c = 0.
Definition Description∗ Terminology from the statistical literature∗∗
Pr[Y a,c=d=0k+1 = 1] risk under elimination of competing events marginal cumulative incidence,
net risk
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1] risk without elimination of competing events subdistribution function,
cause-specific cumulative incidence
crude risk
Pr[Y a,c=d=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,c=d=0
k = 0] hazard under elimination of competing events marginal hazard
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,c=0
k = 0] hazard without elimination of competing events subdistribution hazard
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1|D
a,c=0
k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0] hazard conditioned on competing events cause-specific hazard
∗ Descriptions implicitly include interventions that set A to a and eliminate loss to follow-up c = 0. Similar descriptions of risk were given in the early
statistical literature on competing events without discussion of interventions on treatment and loss to follow-up [Chiang, 1961].
∗∗ Based on Table 1.1 of a recent textbook by Geskus 2016.
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Under this definition of the counterfactual outcome, the average causal effect of treatment A
on the event of interest by k + 1 is
Pr[Y a=1,c=d=0k+1 = 1]− Pr[Y
a=0,c=d=0
k+1 = 1] (6)
The contrast (6) is a (controlled) direct effect [Robins and Greenland, 1992]. The direct effect
quantifies the treatment’s effect on the event of interest not mediated by competing events. The
causal directed acyclic graph (DAG) [Pearl, 1995] in Figure 1 depicts an underlying data generating
assumption for two arbitrary follow-up times under which the competing event may mediate the
treatment’s effect on the event of interest; e.g. via the causal path A → Dk → Yk or the causal
path A → Dk → Dk+1 → Yk+1. Note that the arrow from Dk to Yk (or Dk+1 to Yk+1) must be
included because, by definition, if Dk = 1 then Yk = 0.
4.2 Total effects
Suppose we consider the alternative counterfactual outcome Y a,c=0k+1 , k = 0, . . . ,K, which does
not entail any hypothetical intervention on competing events. Let Da,c=0k+1 be an indicator of the
competing event by k + 1 had, possibly contrary to fact, an individual received A = a and was
not lost to follow-up by k + 1. For this choice of counterfactual outcome, competing events are
not censoring events because for an individual who experiences the competing event by k + 1,
we are not precluded from observing the counterfactual outcome Y a,c=0k+1 . Any individual with
(Y a,c=0k = 0,D
a,c=0
k+1 = 1) has future counterfactual outcomes Y
a,c=0
k+1 = 0. Note that there are
two types of individuals with Y a,c=0k+1 = 0: those who survive both the event of interest and the
competing event (e.g., do not die of any cause) through k+1 and those who experience a competing
event (e.g., die from cardiovascular disease) by k + 1.
Then the counterfactual risk by k + 1 under a
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1] (7)
is the risk that would have been observed if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and we
had somehow eliminated losses to follow-up but not competing events. This risk without elimination
of competing events (7) can be alternatively represented as Pr[T a,c=0 ≤ tk+1, J
a,c=0 = 1] where
T a,c=0 is the counterfactual time to either the event of interest (Ja,c=0 = 1) or a competing event
(Ja,c=0 = 2), whichever comes first. Equivalence between Pr[T a,c=0 ≤ tk+1, J
a,c=0 = 1] and the risk
without elimination of competing events follows by Y a,c=0k+1 = I(T
a,c=0 ≤ tk+1, J
a,c=0 = 1), with I(·)
the indicator function. The risk without elimination of competing events has been referred to as
the subdistribution function, cause-specific cumulative incidence function, or crude risk for cause
J = 1 at tk+1[Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980, Fine and Gray, 1999, Geskus, 2016]. Note that both
the risk under elimination of competing events (5) and the risk without elimination of competing
events (7) are “marginal” (population-level) risks but they correspond to the marginal distributions
of different counterfactual outcomes.
Under this definition of the counterfactual outcome, the average causal effect of treatment A
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on the event of interest by k + 1 is
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1]− Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1]. (8)
The contrast (8) quantifies the total effect of treatment on the event of interest through all causal
pathways between treatment and the event of interest, including those possibly mediated by the
competing event (see Figure 1).
As we discuss in Section 6, it will be useful to define the risk of the competing event by k + 1
under a
Pr[Da,c=0k+1 = 1] (9)
When, as in our example, the original event of interest is also a competing event for the origi-
nal competing event (that is, when the event of interest and the competing event are mutually
competing events), the risk (9) has been referred to as the subdistribution function, cause-specific
cumulative incidence function, or crude risk for cause J = 2 at tk+1 [Kalbfleisch and Prentice,
1980, Fine and Gray, 1999, Geskus, 2016]. Our presentation is generally agnostic as to whether the
data structure corresponds to this mutually competing events setting or a so-called semi-competing
risk setting [Fine et al., 2001], noting when any distinction is needed. A semi-competing risk set-
ting would occur, for example, were the event of interest prostate cancer diagnosis, which is not a
competing event for death from other causes.
A definition of the average causal effect of treatment A on the competing event by k+1 is then
Pr[Da=1,c=0k+1 = 1]− Pr[D
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1] (10)
which quantifies the total effect of treatment on the competing event through all causal pathways
between treatment and the competing event, including those possibly mediated by the event of
interest.
Another common estimand in competing risks settings is the result of redefining the event of
interest as a composite outcome. In our example, this would be equivalent to changing the event of
interest from prostate cancer death to death from any cause, which is precisely the case in which
competing events do not exist and the estimands of Section 3 apply. The risk of this composite
outcome by k+1 under a is Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1 or D
a,c=0
k+1 = 1] and the average causal effect of treatment
A on this composite outcome by k + 1 is
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1 or D
a=1,c=0
k+1 = 1]− Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1 or D
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1] (11)
which quantifies the total effect of treatment on the composite outcome by k+1 through all causal
pathways. It is straightforward to see that, when the event of interest and the competing event are
mutually competing events, the effect (11) is simply the sum of (8) and (10).
4.3 Counterfactual hazards
Using the various counterfactual outcome definitions above, various discrete-time hazards can be
defined. First, the hazard under elimination of competing events (5)
Pr[Y a,c=d=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,c=d=0
k = 0] (12)
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is the hazard of the event of interest at k + 1 if all individuals had been assigned to treatment
a and we had somehow eliminated both loss to follow-up and competing events. For T a,c=d=0,
the counterfactual time to failure from the event of interest under an intervention that sets A to
a and eliminates both loss to follow-up and competing events, we can equivalently write (12) as
Pr[T a,c=d=0 ∈ (tk, tk+1]|T
a,c=d=0 > tk]. The hazard under elimination of competing events has been
referred to as the marginal hazard [Geskus, 2016].
Second, the hazard without elimination of competing events
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,c=0
k = 0] (13)
is the hazard of the event of interest at k+1 had all individuals been assigned to treatment a and we
had somehow eliminated losses to follow-up but not competing events. The “risk set” of individuals
at k, i.e, those with Y a,c=0k = 0, in this case is comprised by (i) those who have experienced neither
the event of interest nor the competing event, and (ii) those who have not experienced the event of
interest but have experienced the competing event by k. The hazard without elimination of com-
peting events (13) can alternatively be represented as Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (tk, tk+1], J
a,c=0 = 1|(T a,c=0 >
tk or {T
a,c=0 ≤ tk and J
a,c=0 6= 1})], which follows by Y a,c=0k+1 = I(T
a,c=0 ≤ tk+1, J
a,c=0 = 1) and
I(Y a,c=0k = 0) = I({Y
a,c=0
k = 0,D
a,c=0
k = 0} or {Y
a,c=0
k = 0,D
a,c=0
k = 1})
= I(T a,c=0 > tk or {T
a,c=0 ≤ tk and J
a,c=0 6= 1})
This quantity has been referred to as the subdistribution hazard for cause J = 1 [Fine and Gray,
1999].
A third definition in the statistical literature is the hazard of the event of interest at k + 1
among those who have not previously experienced the competing event. When A is set to a and
loss to follow-up is eliminated, this hazard conditioned on competing events can be written as
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1|D
a,c=0
k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0] (14)
or, alternatively, as Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (tk, tk+1], J
a,c=0 = 1|T a,c=0 > tk]. This quantity has been referred
to as the cause-specific hazard for cause J = 1 [Geskus, 2016, Andersen et al., 2012].
Under the hazard definition (14), competing events are conditioning events but not censoring
events. That is, competing events do not render the counterfactual outcome of interest Y a,c=0k+1
unobserved for all a because Y a,c=0k+1 = 0 for any individual who previously experienced a competing
event without experiencing the event of interest. That competing events are not censoring events for
the cause-specific hazard seems to be in conflict with the use of methods for “right-censored data”
(e.g., Cox proportional hazards regression) to estimate contrasts of this type of hazard [Cox, 1975].
The explanation of this apparent paradox is that, under certain assumptions described below, the
cause-specific hazard (14) may identify the hazard under elimination of competing events (12), a
quantity for which competing events are censoring events.
By these three different definitions of the hazard, we might consider three different contrasts in
counterfactual hazards (e.g. hazard ratios) under different levels of treatment a = 1 versus a = 0:
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a contrast in the hazards under elimination of competing events
Pr[Y a=1,c=d=0k+1 = 1|Y
a=1,c=d=0
k = 0] vs. Pr[Y
a=0,c=d=0
k+1 = 1|Y
a=0,c=d=0
k = 0], (15)
a contrast in the hazards without elimination of competing events (subdistribution hazards)
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1|Y
a=1,c=0
k = 0] vs. Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1|Y
a=0,c=0
k = 0], (16)
or a contrast in the hazards conditioned on competing events (cause-specific hazards)
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1|D
a=1,c=0
k+1 = Y
a=1,c=0
k = 0] vs. Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1|D
a=0,c=0
k+1 = Y
a=0,c=0
k = 0] (17)
As discussed above, none of these three contrasts in counterfactual hazards can in general be
interpreted as a causal effect [Herna´n et al., 2004, Herna´n, 2010]. Unlike risks, hazards may differ
just because of differences in individuals who survive until k under a = 1 versus a = 0 due to
treatment effects before k (also see Section 5.3).
Finally, in later sections we will reference the hazard of the competing event itself at k + 1
among those who have not previously experienced the event of interest under a. This coincides
with the cause-specific hazard for cause J = 2 or
Pr[Da,c=0k+1 = 1|D
a,c=0
k = Y
a,c=0
k = 0]. (18)
which is alternatively written Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (tk, tk+1], J
a,c=0 = 2|T a,c=0 > tk].
5 Identification of estimands when competing events exist
We now provide conditions under which the various counterfactual estimands of Section 4 can
be identified when the data described in Section 2 are available. The nature of these conditions
depends on whether competing events are defined as censoring events. Without loss of generality,
we consider identification of the risk only by K + 1.
5.1 Direct effects
To identify the risk under elimination of competing events, and in turn the direct effect (6), we
must make untestable assumptions. For each k = 0, . . . ,K, consider the following three identifying
assumptions:
1. Exchangeability 1:
Y
a,c=d=0
K+1
∐
A|L0,
Y
a,c=d=0
k+1
∐
(Ck+1,Dk+1)|Lk = lk, Y k = Ck = Dk = 0, A = a (19)
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where lk is some realization of Lk. This assumption requires that, in addition to the baseline
observed treatment, at each follow-up time, conditional on the measured past, all forms of
censoring are independent of future counterfactual outcomes had everyone followed A = a
and censoring were eliminated. Because loss to follow-up and competing events cannot be
randomly assigned by an investigator in practice, this condition will not hold by design, even
in an experiment in which A is randomized.
The causal DAG in Figure 1 depicts a data generation process under which exchangeabil-
ity (19) holds by the absence of unblocked backdoor paths [Pearl, 1995] between (i) A and
both Yk and Yk+1 conditional on L0 and (ii) Dk and both Yk and Yk+1 conditional on A
and L0; Ck+1 and Yk+1 conditional on Lk, Yk, Dk, A and L0; and Dk+1 and Yk+1 condi-
tional on Ck+1, Lk, Yk, Dk, A and L0. In Figure 1, (ii) is guaranteed by the absence of
arrows from U , an unmeasured risk factor for the event of interest, into Dk, Ck+1 and Dk+1.
Note that we have omitted other arrows on the graph (e.g. an arrow from Lk to Yk+1) to
reduce clutter as adding any missing arrows from past into future measured variables will
still preserve (i) and (ii). For interested readers, in Appendix A we illustrate an alterna-
tive approach to graphical representation of exchangeability using Single World Intervention
Graphs (SWIGS)[Richardson and Robins, 2013] which allows explicit representation of coun-
terfactuals on the graph. This approach, in turn, makes more explicit the role of the target
counterfactual estimand in graphical evaluation of exchangeability.
2. Positivity 1:
fA,Lk,Ck,Dk,Yk(a, lk, 0, 0, 0) 6= 0 =⇒
Pr[Ck+1 = 0,Dk+1 = 0|Lk = lk, Ck = Dk = Yk = 0, A = a] > 0 w.p.1. (20)
where fA,Lk,Ck,Dk,Yk(a, lk, 0, 0, 0) is the joint density of (A,Lk, Ck,Dk, Yk) evaluated at (a, lk, 0, 0, 0).
This assumption requires that, for any possibly observed level of treatment and covariate his-
tory amongst those remaining uncensored (here free of competing events and loss to follow-up)
and free of the the event of interest through k, some individuals continue to remain uncensored
through k + 1.
3. Consistency 1:
If A = a and Ck+1 = Dk+1 = 0,
then Lk+1 = L
a,c=d=0
k+1 and Y k+1 = Y
a,c=d=0
k+1 (21)
This assumption requires that, if an individual has data consistent with the interventions
indexing the counterfactual outcome through k+1, then her observed outcomes and covariates
through k+1 equal her counterfactual outcomes and covariates under that intervention. The
consistency assumption requires well-defined interventions, which is particularly problematic
when, as here, the estimand implies an unspecified intervention to eliminate death from other
causes [Robins and Greenland, 2000, VanderWeele, 2009, Herna´n, 2016].
Under conditions (19), (20) and (21), the risk under elimination of competing events by K +1,
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Figure 1: A causal DAG representing observed data generating assumptions under which (i) com-
peting events may mediate the effect of treatment A on the event of interest and (ii) exchangeability
(19) holds such that the direct effect (6) may be identified.
Pr[Y a,c=d=0K+1 = 1], is identified by the following function of the observed data:
∑
lK
K∑
k=0
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Lk = lk, Ck+1 = Dk+1 = Y k = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
{Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j−1 = 0, A = a]×
f(lj|lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, a)} (22)
where Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Lk = lk, Ck+1 = Dk+1 = Y k = 0, A = a] is the observed discrete-time hazard
at k + 1 of the event of interest conditional on treatment and covariate history among those still
free of the competing event and not lost to follow-up, and f(lj|lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, a) is the
conditional density of Lj. For j = 0, f(lj|lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, a) ≡ f(l0).
We say that expression (22) is the g-formula for the risk under elimination of competing
events Pr[Y a,c=d=0K+1 = 1] [Robins, 1986]. The proof of equivalence between the g-formula (22)
and Pr[Y a,c=d=0 = 1] under conditions (19), (20) and (21) was given by Robins1986, 1997 and is
reviewed in Appendix B. The g-formula (22) has several algebraically equivalent representations.
For example, we can equivalently write (22) using the following inverse probability weighted (IPW)
representation
K∑
k=0
hk(a)
k−1∏
j=0
[1− hj(a)] (23)
where
hk(a) =
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)Wk|A = a]
E[(1− Yk)Wk]A = a]
(24)
and Wk = W
C
k ×W
D
k with
WCk =
k∏
j=0
I(Cj+1 = 0)
Pr[Cj+1 = 0|Lj, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, A = a]
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and
WDk =
k∏
j=0
I(Dj+1 = 0)
Pr[Dj+1 = 0|Lj , Cj+1 = Dj = Y j = 0, A = a]
where E[·] denotes expectation and the denominators of the weights WCk and W
D
k denote the
probabilities of remaining free of each type of censoring (loss to follow-up and competing events,
respectively) by k+1 conditional on measured history. See Appendix B. Our ability to represent the
g-formula in different yet algebraically equivalent ways has implications for choices in estimating
this function in practice, as discussed in Section 7.
We note that, in many randomized trials, including the trial analyzed in Section 8, only baseline
covariates L0 are measured. In this case, in order to identify causal treatment effects, a stronger
version of exchangeability (19) must hold with Lk replaced only by L0 for all k. This stronger
version of exchangeability requires that censoring at any time during the follow-up is independent
of changing values of prognostic factors during the follow-up, often an implausible assumption,
particularly when competing events are defined as censoring events.
5.2 Total effects
To identify the risk without elimination of competing events, and in turn the total effect (8),
we must also make untestable assumptions. However, because only losses to follow-up (and not
competing events) are censoring events for total effects, the assumptions required to identify total
effects are weaker than those required to identify direct effects.
Specifically, for each k = 0, . . . ,K, consider the following alternative versions of exchangeability,
positivity and consistency:
1. Exchangeability 2:
Y
a,c=0
K+1
∐
A|L0,
Y
a,c=0
k+1
∐
Ck+1|Lk = lk,Dk = dk, Y k = Ck = 0, A = a (25)
where Dk may be viewed as a covariate like those in Lk. This assumption requires that, in
addition to the baseline observed treatment, at each follow-up time, given the measured past,
censoring (here, only loss to follow-up) is independent of future counterfactual outcomes had
everyone followed A = a and censoring were eliminated.
The causal DAG in Figure 2 depicts a data generating process under which exchangeability
(25) holds. The only difference between Figure 2 and Figure 1 is the former allows for
the presence of arrows from the unmeasured risk factor for the event of interest U into the
competing event at each time (Dk and Dk+1).The presence of these arrows would violate
assumption (19) rendering direct effects unidentified. Figure 2 is consistent with assumption
(25) by (i) the absence of any unblocked backdoor paths between A and both Yk and Yk+1
conditional on L0 and (ii) the absence of such paths between Ck+1 and Yk+1, conditional on
Lk, Yk, Dk, A and L0. The latter is guaranteed by the lack of an arrow from U into Ck+1.
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Figure 2: A causal DAG representing observed data generating assumptions under which exchange-
ability (25) holds and the total effect of treatment A on the event of interest (8) may be identified.
2. Positivity 2:
fA,Lk,Dk,Ck,Yk(a, lk, dk, 0, 0) 6= 0 =⇒
Pr[Ck+1 = 0|Lk = lk,Dk = dk, Ck = Yk = 0, A = a] > 0 w.p.1 (26)
where fA,Lk,Dk,Ck,Yk(a, lk, dk, 0, 0) is the joint density of (A,Lk,Dk, Ck, Yk) evaluated at (a, lk, dk, 0, 0).
Note that for any k such that Dk = 1, this assumption holds by definition because, in this
case, the probability of remaining uncensored by k + 1 is 1 (individuals who fail from the
competing event by k are, by definition, not censored).
3. Consistency 2:
If A = a and Ck+1 = 0,
then Lk+1 = L
a,c=0
k+1 , Dk+1 = D
a,c=0
k+1 and Y k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k+1 (27)
Under conditions (25), (26) and (27), the risk without elimination of competing events by K+1
Pr[Y a,c=0K+1 = 1] is identified by the following g-formula:
∑
lK
∑
dK+1
K∑
k=0
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Lk = lk,Dk+1 = dk+1, Ck+1 = Y k = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
{Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1,Dj = dj, Cj = Y j−1 = 0, A = a]×
Pr[Dj+1 = dj+1|lj , dj , Cj+1 = Y j = 0, a] × f(lj|lj−1, dj, Cj = Y j = 0, a)} (28)
which follows directly from earlier results by Robins1986, 1997 when, as discussed in Appendix B,
Dk is defined as a component of Lk.
However, because Dk has a deterministic relationship with the event of interest, expression (28)
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is algebraically equivalent to the following somewhat simplified expression [Taubman et al., 2009]
∑
lK
K∑
k=0
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Lk = lk, Ck+1 = Dk+1 = Y k = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
{Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j−1 = 0, A = a]×
Pr[Dj+1 = 0|lj, Cj+1 = Dj = Y j = 0, a]× f(lj |lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, a)} (29)
where Pr[Dk+1 = 1|lk,Dk = Ck+1 = Y k = 0, a] is the observed discrete-time hazard of the
competing event in interval k+ 1 conditional on treatment and covariate history among those still
not lost to follow-up. This simplification results from the fact that all terms in the sum (28) over
dK+1 are zero when dk+1 = 1 for any k = 0, . . . ,K.
Analogously, there are different algebraically equivalent representations of (29). One IPW
representation is:
K∑
k=0
hsubk (a)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− hsubj (a)
]
(30)
where
hsubk (a) =
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
sub
k |A = a]
E[(1 − Yk)W
sub
k |A = a]
, (31)
and
W subk =
k∏
j=0
I(Cj+1 = 0)
Pr[Cj+1 = 0|Dj, Lj, Cj = Y j = 0, A = a]
.
A second algebraically equivalent IPW representation of (29) is:
K∑
k=0
h1k(a){1 − h
2
k(a)}
k−1∏
j=0
[{1− h1j (a)}{1 − h
2
j (a)}] (32)
where
h1k(a) =
E[ Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[ (1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
, (33)
h2k(a) =
E[ Dk+1(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[ (1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
, (34)
and WCk is defined as in Section 5.1. See Appendix B.
Note that in a trial where A is randomized and no one is lost to follow-up (there are no
censoring events), then exchangeability (25) is expected for Lk = ∅. It is straightforward to see in
this case that, even when competing events exist, the identifying function (29) for the risk without
elimination of competing events, and any of its algebraically equivalent alternative representations,
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reduces simply to Pr[YK+1 = 1|A = a]; in turn, in this special case, the total effect on the event of
interest (8) is guaranteed identified by Pr[YK+1 = 1|A = 1]− Pr[YK+1 = 1|A = 0].
Finally, note that arguments similar to those given in this section follow for identification of the
risk of the competing event itself by K + 1 under a (9) and, in turn, the total treatment effect on
the competing event (10), in data with censoring events. These assumptions are given in Corollary
8, Appendix B along with the corresponding g-formula for (9).
5.3 Counterfactual hazards
In this section, we consider assumptions that allow identification of the three counterfactual defini-
tions of a hazard when competing events exist: the hazard under elimination of competing events
(12), the hazard without elimination of competing events (13) (subdistribution hazard) and the
hazard conditioned on competing events (14) (cause-specific hazard).
5.3.1 The hazard under elimination of competing events
Consider the IPW representation of the g-formula for the risk under elimination of competing events
(23). This function is comprised of the observed data functions (24) indexed by k = 0, . . . ,K. In
Appendix B, we prove that given the identifying assumptions (19), (20) and (21), the observed data
function (24) indexed by k identifies the hazard at k + 1 under elimination of competing events
(12). Thus, the same assumptions that allow identification of a direct effect on the event of interest
(6) also give identification of the counterfactual contrast (15). As described in Section 5.1, these
assumptions are consistent with the causal diagram in Figure 1 but fail under the causal diagram in
Figure 2 where, in particular, the competing event and the event of interest share an unmeasured
common cause (U).
The observed data function (24) is a weighted version of the observed cause-specific hazard of
the event of interest conditioned on remaining free of loss to follow-up and A = a. To see this, note
that under the further restrictive assumption that exchangeability (19) holds for Lk = ∅ (consistent
with Figure 1 under removal of all arrows into the competing event and loss to follow-up at any
time), the identifying function (24) reduces to simply Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Ck+1 = Dk+1 = Y k = 0, A = a].
This clarifies why (possibly weighted) estimation methods (e.g. partial likelihood methodsCox
[1975]) for contrasts in observed cause-specific hazards (estimands relative to which competing
events are not censoring events) can be used to target contrasts in hazards under elimination of
competing events (estimands relative to which competing events are censoring events).
5.3.2 The hazard without elimination of competing events (subdistribution hazard)
Now consider the IPW representation of the g-formula for the risk without elimination of competing
events (30). This function is comprised of the observed data functions (31) indexed by k = 0, . . . ,K.
In Appendix B, we prove that given the identifying assumptions (25), (26) and (27), the observed
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data function (31) indexed by k identifies the hazard at k + 1 without elimination of competing
events (13). Thus, the same assumptions that allow identification of the total effect on the event of
interest (8) also give identification of the counterfactual contrast (16). As described in Section 5.2,
these assumptions are consistent with the causal diagram in Figure 2 which is the same as Figure
1 but relaxes the restrictive assumption that the competing event and the event of interest share
no unmeasured common causes (by the allowance of arrows from U into Dk and Dk+1).
5.3.3 The hazard conditioned on competing events (cause-specific hazard)
Finally, consider the alternative IPW representation of the g-formula for risk without elimination
of competing events (32). This function is comprised of the observed data functions (33) and
(34) indexed by k = 0, . . . ,K. In Appendix B, we prove that given the identifying assumptions
(25), (26), (27) and additional assumptions that identify the risk of the competing event itself
by K + 1 under a as in (9) (see Corollary 8, Appendix B), then the observed data function (33)
indexed by k identifies the hazard at k + 1 conditioned on competing events (14). Further, under
these assumptions, the observed data function (34) indexed by k identifies the hazard at k + 1
of the competing event itself (18). Thus, given assumptions that give identification of both the
total effect on the event of interest (8) and the total effect on the competing event (10), we also
have identification of the counterfactual contrast (17) (along with a comparable contrast in the
competing event itself under different levels of a).
We note that the data generating assumptions of Figure 2 are consistent with exchangeability
assumptions required for identification of both (8) and (10) by the absence of any unblocked back-
door paths between (i) A and future event of interest status (Yk, Yk+1), as well as future competing
event status (Dk,Dk+1), conditional on L0 and (ii) Ck+1 and future event status (Yk+1), as well as
future competing event status (Dk+1), conditional on Lk, Yk, Dk, A and L0.
5.3.4 The “hazards of hazard ratios” revisited
We have now established that, under Figure 1, all three types of counterfactual hazard may be iden-
tified. However, as is true when competing events do not exist [Herna´n et al., 2004, Herna´n, 2010],
contrasts of hazards when competing events exist do not generally have a causal interpretation,
even under the restrictive assumptions depicted in Figure 1.
Specifically, consider a counterfactual subdistribution hazard ratio as in (16). Because this
contrast is conditional on previous survival from the event of interest, as represented in Figure 3
(square boxes around a node mean conditioning), the hazard ratio quantifies not only the causal
paths between A and Yk+1, but also the non-causal path A → Yk ← U → Yk+1 created by
conditioning on the common effect Yk of treatment A and the unmeasured variable U . Similar
graphical arguments can be used to illustrate that the counterfactual hazard contrasts (15) or (17),
which includes cause-specific hazard ratios, will not generally have a causal interpretation under
the realistic assumption that there exist unmeasured common causes of early and late status on
the event of interest. Note that even identification of the direct effect allows the presence of such
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Figure 3: Graphical illustration of why contrasts in counterfactual hazard ratios may not have a
causal interpretation even under conditions that give identification of contrasts in any estimand in
Table 1 under different levels of a.
unmeasured common causes; as we discussed in Section 5.1, Figure 1 is consistent with identification
of the direct effect (6).
6 Choosing a definition of causal effect when competing events
exist
We have explicitly defined two possible definitions of a causal treatment effect on the event of
interest when competing events exist: the total effect and a direct effect. Both are defined as
contrasts in counterfactual risks. In this section, we consider the choice between these two types of
causal effects.
As discussed in Section 5, the total effect of treatment on the risk of the event of interest
(8) can be identified under weaker untestable assumptions than those required for identification
of the direct effect (6). Further, as discussed in Section 5.2, identifying assumptions for the total
effect are expected to hold by design in a trial where A is randomly assigned and there is no loss
to follow-up. However, the total effect may have an uncertain interpretation when the treatment
affects the competing event.
Consider the following extreme case. Suppose that all individuals in a study population of
patients with prostate cancer would die immediately from cardiovascular disease if, possibly con-
trary to fact, they were assigned estrogen therapy treatment A = 1; that is, for all individuals in
the study population Da=1,c=01 = 1. As it is impossible to die of prostate cancer after dying from
cardiovascular disease, it follows that none of these individuals would die of prostate cancer (have
the event of interest) if they were assigned A = 1; that is, Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1] = 0 for all k. Suppose
further that no individual would die from any cause other than prostate cancer during the study
period if, possibly contrary to fact, they were assigned placebo A = 0; that is, for all individuals
in the study population, D
a=0,c=0
K+1 = 0. If at least one individual would die of prostate cancer by
k + 1 then 0 < Pr[Y a=0,c=0k+1 = 1] ≤ 1. It follows that the risk difference (8) will be negative. Thus
the total effect of assignment to estrogen therapy versus placebo on risk of prostate cancer death
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is protective.
However, the total effect does not help us understand the reason for this protection; in this
extreme case, the protection occurs only because estrogen therapy instantly kills everyone due to
cardiovascular disease (such that they cannot die of prostate cancer). Reporting both the total
effect of treatment on the event of interest (8) and the total effect of treatment on the risk of the
competing event (10) can alert to the existence of this problem. In our example, (8) is negative
but (10) is positive.
By contrast, the direct effect (6) quantifies an effect of treatment on the event of interest that
is not mediated by the competing event. Therefore, a negative value of the direct effect cannot be
explained (either wholly or in part) by a harmful effect of treatment on the competing event. How-
ever, this direct effect is only well-defined – and, therefore, only possible to confirm in a real-world
study – if there exist sufficiently well-defined interventions to eliminate losses to follow-up and
competing events. While we might imagine a study in which we could eliminate loss to follow-up
(e.g. by investing more financial resources for follow-up), it is often difficult to imagine a study in
which we could eliminate competing events such as death. Other types of competing events may,
in principle, be eliminated [Geskus, 2016]. For example, in a study of the effect of a treatment on
nosocomial infection, hospital discharge is one competing event. However, when interventions d = 0
are not well-defined or are not realistically/ethically implementable, the plausibility of untestable
assumptions required for identification may be especially questionable[Herna´n, 2016]. We consid-
ered these assumptions explicitly in Section 5.1. In Section 9 and Appendix D, we briefly consider
alternative definitions of a treatment effect on the event of interest that does not capture the treat-
ment’s effect on the competing event. Unlike any of the estimands in Table 1, these alternative
definitions are based on contrasts in estimands defined by cross-world counterfactuals; their defi-
nition requires simultaneous knowledge of counterfactual outcomes for the same individual under
different treatment interventions.
In some cases, we may reasonably assume a priori that there is no effect of the treatment on
the competing event; that is, we can remove arrows from treatment into future competing events
on the causal DAG. For example, this would be the case when interest is in the effect of a medical
treatment on a disease outcome in an otherwise healthy population and the only deaths during the
follow-up are due to car accidents. In such cases, the total effect (8) does quantify the effect of
the treatment on the event of interest that does not capture any treatment effect on the competing
event.
Finally, consider the effect of the treatment on the risk of the composite outcome (11). Like
the total effect (8), this estimand does not require conceptualizing interventions on competing
events and is identified by design in a trial where A is randomized and loss to follow-up is absent.
Further, because the competing event is now redefined as part of the outcome, there is no longer
the possibility of mediation by the competing event. However, redefining effects through composite
outcomes does not generally answer the question of interest; e.g. if the event of interest is prostate
cancer death, (11) quantifies the effect of treatment on all-cause mortality and not the effect of
treatment on prostate cancer death. As noted in Section 4, in the case of mutually competing
events, the effects (8) and (10) sum to (11). Thus, when these effects have opposite signs, (11) will
be closer to zero than (8) or (10).
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7 Estimation of direct and total effects
As we established in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the functions (22) and (29), respectively, correspond to
two versions of the g-formula for risk had A been set to a and censoring been eliminated. The
parametric g-formula[Robins, 1986, Taubman et al., 2009, Logan et al., 2016] and inverse proba-
bility weighting[Robins and Finkelstein, 2000, Herna´n et al., 2000] are two possible approaches to
estimating the g-formula and associated contrasts. Below, we briefly review some possible imple-
mentations of these approaches for the direct effect (8) and total effect (10).
7.1 Direct effects
A parametric g-formula estimator of (22) directly estimates under model constraints the com-
ponents of the g-formula expression then uses Monte Carlo simulation based on the estimated
conditional densities of Lk to approximate the high-dimensional sum/integral over all risk factor
histories [Taubman et al., 2009, Young et al., 2011, Logan et al., 2016]. If we can assume exchange-
ability given only L0 then (22) reduces to only a function of the observed cause-specific hazards
of the event of interest and no Monte Carlo simulation is required. Such a simplified parametric
g-formula estimator of (22) is
1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
p(a, l0i, k; θˆ)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− p(a, l0i, j; θˆ)
]
(35)
where p(a, l0i, k; θ) is a model (e.g. a pooled over time logistic regression model[D’Agostino et al.,
1990]) indexed by parameter θ for the observed conditional cause-specific hazard of the event of
interest Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Ck+1 = Dk+1 = Y k = 0, A = a, L0] evaluated at treatment level a and
individual i’s observed values of the baseline covariates l0i with θˆ a consistent estimator of the
true θ. Alternative implementations of the parametric g-formula can be based on assumptions of
continuous time hazard models; e.g. proportional hazards [Cox, 1975, Breslow, 1972] or additive
hazards [Aalen et al., 2008] models .
The IPW representation (23) of the g-formula (22) helps to motivate an alternative approach to
the parametric g-formula for estimating (22) and corresponding contrasts under different levels of a.
Following previous authors [JM Robins and A Rotnitzky, 1992, Robins, 1993, Robins and Finkelstein,
2000], an IPW estimator can be constructed as the complement of a weighted product-limit (Kaplan-
Meier) estimator [Kaplan and Meier, 1958] as follows, with (ai, lKi, cK+1i, dK+1i, yK+1i) individual
i’s values of (A,LK , CK+1,DK+1, Y K+1):
K∑
k=0
hˆk(a; αˆ, ηˆ)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− hˆj(a; αˆ, ηˆ)
]
(36)
where hˆk(a; αˆ, ηˆ) =
∑n
i=1 yk+1i(1−yki)wki(αˆ,ηˆ)I(ai=a)∑n
i=1(1−yki)wki(αˆ,ηˆ)I(ai=a)
, wki(αˆ, ηˆ) =
∏k
j=0(1−cj+1i)(1−dj+1i)
∏k
j=0[1−r(a,lji,j;αˆ)][1−q(a,lji,j;ηˆ)]
, r(a, lji, j;α)
and q(a, lji, j; η) are models (e.g. pooled over time logistic regression models) indexed by param-
eters α and η for the observed cause-specific loss to follow-up Pr[Cj+1 = 1|Lj = lji, Cj = Dj =
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Y j = 0, A = a] and competing event Pr[Dj+1 = 1|Lj = lji, Cj+1 = Dj = Y k = 0, A = a] hazards
with αˆ and ηˆ consistent estimators of α and η, respectively.
Unlike the parametric g-formula estimator, which relies on correctly specified models for time-
varying observed cause-specific event of interest hazards, as well as (generally) the joint conditional
distributions of the time-varying confounders Lk, consistency – here, meaning statistical conver-
gence rather than (21) or (27) – of the IPW estimator requires only correct specification of the
weight denominator models (for the observed loss to follow-up and competing event hazards). An
alternative approach based on a stabilized weighting scheme [Herna´n et al., 2000] that multiplies the
numerator of wki(αˆ, ηˆ) by any function of, at most, a and k may reduce variability of the weights.
Note that, unlike the parametric g-formula, the algorithmic complexity of IPW estimation does
not substantially change under adjustment for only L0. In this case, we simply replace functions
of Lj with functions of L0 in the weight denominator models. Alternative estimators of (22) and
corresponding contrasts under different levels of a with double-robust properties follow from pre-
vious work by treating competing events like loss to follow-up [JM Robins and A Rotnitzky, 1992,
Robins, 1993, van der Laan and Robins, 2003, Bang and Robins, 2005, Schnitzer et al., 2015]. Ex-
tensions that allow construction of sensitivity bounds under violations of exchangeability (19) have
also been derived [DO Scharfstein and A Rotnitzky and JM Robins, 1999].
7.2 Total effects
A key distinction between expressions (22) and (29) is that the latter depends on knowledge of the
time-varying observed cause-specific hazards of the competing event Pr[Dk+1 = 1|Lk = lk,Dk =
Ck+1 = Y k = 0, A = a] while the former does not. Thus, a parametric g-formula estimator for the
latter will rely on an estimate of this quantity – e.g. correct specification of the model q(a, lj , j; η)
as defined in the previous section – while the former will not. See Logan et al.Logan et al. [2016]
for an implementation of the parametric g-formula in SAS for estimating either (22) or (29) and
associated contrasts (risk differences/risk ratios).
Similarly, the algorithmic complexity of this approach simplifies considerably when exchange-
ability given only L0 is assumed. In this restricted case, expression (29) will only depend on the
time-varying observed cause-specific hazards of the event of interest and the competing event. A
parametric g-formula estimator in this case is
1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
p(a, l0i, k; θˆ) [1− q(a, l0i, k; ηˆ)]
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− p(a, l0i, j; θˆ)
]
[1− q(a, l0i, j; ηˆ)] (37)
where, as above, pk(a, l0, k; θ) and qk(a, l0, k; η) are models for the observed event of interest and
competing event cause-specific hazards, respectively conditional on A = a, L0 = l0 and remaining
not lost.
We considered two different algebraically equivalent IPW representations of the g-formula (29),
motivating two different IPW approaches. Following the algebraic equivalence between the g-
formula (29) and the IPW expression (30), an IPW estimator based on weighted estimates of the
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observed subdistribution hazards of the event of interest is:
K∑
k=0
hˆsubk (a; rˆ
sub)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− hˆsubj (a; rˆ
sub)
]
(38)
where hˆsubk (a; rˆ
sub) =
∑n
i=1 yk+1i(1−yki)w
sub
ki
(rˆsub)I(ai=a)∑n
i=1(1−yki)w
sub
ki
(rˆsub)I(ai=a)
, wsubki (rˆ
sub) =
∏k
j=0(1−cj+1i)
∏k
j=0[1−rˆ
sub(a,lji,dji,j)]
, and rˆsub(a, lji, dji, j) =
r(a, lji, j; αˆ) (as above, a model-based estimate of the loss to follow-up hazard Pr[Cj+1 = 1|Lj =
lji, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, A = a]) when dji = 0 and, otherwise, rˆ
sub(a, lji, dji, j) is an estimate of
Pr[Cj+1 = 1|Lj = lji, Cj = Y j = 0,Dj, A = a] amongst those with Ds = 1, for some s ≤ j. The
latter must always take the value zero because once an individual experiences the competing event,
he cannot be subsequently lost.
Following the algebraic equivalence of the g-formula (29) and (32) an alternative IPW estimator
based on weighted estimates of the observed cause-specific hazards of the event of interest and the
competing event is:
K∑
k=0
hˆ1k(a; αˆ){1− hˆ
2
k(a; αˆ)}
k−1∏
j=0
[{1− hˆ1j (a; αˆ)}{1 − hˆ
2
j (a; αˆ)}] (39)
where hˆ1k(a; αˆ) =
∑n
i=1 yk+1i(1−yki)(1−dki)w
c
ki
(αˆ)I(ai=a)∑n
i=1(1−yki)(1−dki)w
c
ki
(αˆ)I(ai=a)
, hˆ2k(a; αˆ) =
∑n
i=1 dk+1i(1−yki)(1−dki)w
c
ki
(αˆ)I(ai=a)∑n
i=1(1−yki)(1−dki)w
c
ki
(αˆ)I(ai=a)
,
wcki(αˆ) =
∏k
j=0(1−cj+1i)
∏k
j=0[1−r(a,lji,j;αˆ)]
with, as above, r(a, lj, j;α) a model for the loss to follow-up hazard. The
estimator (39) coincides with a weighted Aalen-Johansen estimator 1978. Analogously, consistency
of either the IPW estimator (38) or (39) of the g-formula (29) requires fewer model assumptions
than those required for the corresponding parametric g-formula estimator. Also, as above, the
general algorithmic complexity of either of the above IPW estimators does not substantially change
under adjustment for only L0; we simply replace functions of Lj with functions of L0 in the weight
denominator models.
Various estimators of contrasts in (29) for different treatment interventions given by Bekaert
et al. [Bekaert et al., 2010], Lok et al. [Lok et al., 2018], Moodie et al. [Moodie et al., 2014] and
Appendix D of Young et al.Young et al. [2018] allow exchangeability to depend on time-varying
Lk. Alternative estimators of (29) under exchangeability given only L0 follow from results in Fine
and Gray Fine and Gray [1999]. See Appendix C for a discussion of parametric g-formula or IPW
estimators of the risk of the competing event itself (9) and corresponding effects (10).
8 Example: A randomized trial on prostate cancer therapy
We illustrate the ideas outlined above using data from a trial that randomly assigned estrogen ther-
apy, Diethylstilbestrol (DES), or placebo to prostate cancer patients. These data are freely available
at http://biostat.mc.vanderbilt.edu/DataSets and have been used in several methodological
articles on competing risks[Byar and Green, 1980, Fine, 1999, Kay, 1986, Harrell et al., 1996]. In
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this trial, 502 patients were assigned to four different treatment arms. Here, we restrict our analysis
to the 125 patients in the high-dose DES arm (A = 1) and the 127 patients in the placebo arm
(A = 0).
Interest is in whether DES has a causal effect on prostate cancer death. Death due to other
causes is therefore a competing event. Follow up data on event status was available in monthly
intervals. We considered effects through follow-up month K+1 = 60 (5-years post-randomization).
In the treatment arm, 26 patients died of prostate cancer and 63 died of other causes. In the
placebo arm, 35 patients died of prostate cancer while 54 died of other causes.
As in many randomized trials, only baseline covariates (L0) were available in this data set
to ensure exchangeability between censored and uncensored patients at each time. We included
the following covariates in L0: baseline measures of daily activity function, age, hemoglobin level,
and history of cardiovascular disease. We applied the parametric g-formula and IPW estimators
described in Section 7 to estimate total and direct treatment effects of DES on prostate cancer death
based on pooled over time logistic models pk(a, l0, k; θ) for the observed cause-specific hazard of the
event of interest , qk(a, l0, k; η) for the observed cause-specific hazard of the competing event and
r(a, l0, k;α) for the observed cause-specific hazard of loss to follow-up . Additional implementation
details for all estimators, including structure of input data sets and model assumptions, are given
in Appendix C along with a description of the parametric g-formula and IPW estimators of the
risk of the competing event itself and the corresponding total treatment effects.
8.1 Total effect of estrogen therapy on prostate cancer death
We estimated the risk of prostate cancer death without elimination of competing events (7) under
assignment to high-dose DES (a = 1) and placebo (a = 0) for each follow-up month k+1 = 1, ...60
using a parametric g-formula estimator as defined in (37), an IPW estimator as defined in (38)
and an alternative IPW estimator as defined in (39). Total effects were estimated as contrasts
(ratios/differences) in these estimated risks across treatment levels. No loss to follow-up occurred
prior to month 50. Therefore, had we decided to limit the follow-up period to any month prior to
month 50 (i.e. set K + 1 < 50), following arguments at the end of Section 5.2, we are guaranteed
identification of the risk without elimination of competing events (7) in all months k + 1 in this
period by the observed data function Pr[Yk+1 = 1|A = a]. Therefore, a consistent estimator by
month k+ 1 within this period can be computed simply by the proportion of those with the event
of interest by k+1 divided by the number of patients randomized to arm A = a. We incorporated
knowledge that the hazard of censoring in the data was zero in all months prior to month 50 into
the weighting of both IPW estimators (see Appendix C). Due to the absence of censoring prior
to month 50, these IPW estimates are guaranteed identical to each other (and the nonparametric
cumulative proportion estimator) prior to month 50.
Total effect estimates by 60 month follow-up, calculated as differences/ratios in estimates of the
risk Pr[Y a,c=060 = 1], for each of the three estimators are presented in Table 2. For all estimators,
95% confidence intervals were calculated from the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of a nonparametric
bootstrap distribution based on 500 bootstrap samples. While 95% confidence intervals are wide,
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point estimates based on all three estimators are in line with a total protective effect of high-dose
DES compared to placebo on the risk of prostate cancer death. Figure 4 shows that the protective
direction of total effect estimates is consistent over most of the 5-year follow-up period for all three
estimation methods (with the curves overlapping only very early in the follow-up).
Table 2: Parametric g-formula and inverse probability weighted (IPW) estimates of the total treat-
ment effect on the risk of the event of interest, total treatment effect on the risk of the competing
event and the direct effect on the risk of the event of interest by 5 year follow-up .
Risk ratio (95% CI∗) Risk difference (95% CI∗)
Total effect (prostate cancer death)
parametric g-formula 0.76 (0.47, 1.24) −0.07 (−0.18, 0.05)
IPW cs∗∗ 0.78 (0.49, 1.28) −0.06 (−0.17, 0.06)
IPW sub∗∗ 0.78 (0.47, 1.32) −0.06 (−0.18, 0.06)
Total effect (other death)
parametric g-formula 1.28 (0.97, 1.61) 0.12 (−0.01, 0.23)
IPW cs∗∗ 1.19 (0.91, 1.54) 0.08 (−0.04, 0.20)
IPW sub∗∗∗ 1.19 (0.90, 1.54) 0.08 (−0.05, 0.21)
Direct effect (prostate cancer death)
parametric g-formula 0.91 (0.57, 1.47) −0.03 (−0.19, 0.14)
IPW 0.98 (0.56, 1.59) −0.01 (−0.20, 0.17)
∗Percentile-based bootstrap from 500 bootstrap samples
∗∗Based on estimator (39) for prostate cancer death and (61) for other death
∗∗∗Based on estimator (38) for prostate cancer death and the same estimator for other death with other death treated
as event of interest
Note that we are guaranteed IPW estimates of the total effect prior to month 50 are unbiased
for the true total effect as in (8) given the randomization of A in this study and the lack of censoring
prior to this time (assuming no measurement error in treatment or time-varying event status). IPW
estimates after month 49 may be subject to bias due to reliance on the identifying assumptions of
Section 5.2. These may be questioned, particularly given the lack of time-updated information on
patient prognostic factors that may also affect loss to follow-up, as well as reliance on no model
misspecification for the observed loss to follow-up hazard Pr[Ck+1 = 1|Dk = Ck = Y k = 0, L0, A =
a] for k + 1 ≥ 50. Parametric g-formula estimators here rely on correct specification of both
the observed cause-specific hazard of the event of interest Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Ck+1 = Dk+1 = Y k =
0, L0, A = a] and the competing event Pr[Dk+1 = 1|Dk = Ck+1 = Y k = 0, L0, A = a] in all months.
For death events (where death records can typically be used to ascertain outcomes), it might be
reasonably argued that loss to follow-up is likely primarily due to random administrative errors
and unrelated to patient specific prognostic factors (i.e. there are no backdoor paths between C
and future Y even marginally on the causal diagram). However, even supposing our estimates of
the total treatment effect on prostate cancer death are unbiased (all identifying assumptions hold
and model misspecification is absent) and even if these estimates were more precise, given some
patients in both arms died of other causes in this study, we cannot rule out that the total effect
may be wholly or in part explained by a harmful effect of DES on death due to other causes.
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Figure 4: Parametric g-formula estimates (37), IPW estimates (38) (IPW sub) and IPW estimates
(39) (IPWcs) of the the risk of prostate cancer death without elimination of competing events by
follow-up month k + 1 = 1, . . . 60 under high-dose Diethylstilbestrol versus placebo.
Given possible mediation by pathways created from a treatment effect on the competing event,
we also estimated the total effect of high-dose DES versus placebo on the risk of other death as in
(10). We analogously used the parametric g-formula and two versions of IPW to estimate the risk
of the competing event itself (9), relying on the same pooled over time logistic regression models
for the observed hazards of prostate cancer death, other death and loss to follow-up referenced
above (see Appendix C). Estimates of the total effect of treatment on other death by 60 months
and 95% confidence intervals are shown in Table 2. Again, while 95% confidence intervals for
all estimators are wide, point estimates are in line with a harmful total effect of treatment on
the competing event. Figure 5, which displays point estimates of the risk of the competing event
by treatment arm a = 1 versus a = 0 over time shows that this harmful direction of the total
effect point estimate is consistent over the 5-year follow-up period for all estimation methods but
with varying magnitude, particularly for the IPW estimators (not surprisingly, the curves based
on the parametric g-formula, which rely on pooled over time models for the event of interest and
competing event hazards, are much smoother). This supports the concern that we cannot be sure
of the interpretation of total effect estimates on prostate cancer death and some type of follow
on (mediation) analysis is necessary to quantify effects of treatment on prostate cancer death not
capturing the treatment’s effect on the competing event. Note Figure 6 shows estimates of the risk
of the composite outcome (death from any cause) by treatment arm over time based on the sum of
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the estimates of the risk of prostate cancer death without elimination of competing events (7) and
other death (9). As we would expect, estimates of the effect on the composite outcome are closer
to the null through most of the follow-up due to the opposite directions of the total effect estimates
on the individual events, prostate cancer death and other death.
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Figure 5: Parametric g-formula estimates (60), IPW estimates (61) (IPWcs) and IPW estimates
of (38) but replacing the event of interest with the competing event (IPW sub) of the risk of other
death by follow-up month k + 1 = 1, . . . 60 under high-dose Diethylstilbestrol versus placebo.
8.2 Direct effect of estrogen therapy on prostate cancer death
We have considered in some detail one approach to mediation analysis: targeting the direct effect
(as in (6) on the additive scale), equivalent to defining the competing event as a censoring event.
We estimated this effect via the parametric g-formula estimator (35) and the IPW estimator (36)
using the same pooled over time logistic regression model assumptions. Table 2 shows that, similar
to total effects, both estimators have low precision in this study.
Provided identifying assumptions of Section 5.1 hold, and there is no model misspecification,
then point estimates of this direct effect suggest a smaller treatment effect (and for IPW essentially
no treatment effect) would remain on the risk of prostate cancer death in this population under
a hypothetical scenario where the treatment’s effect on the competing event is removed. Figure 7
shows that point estimates over time based on both methods are in line with a larger remaining
effect prior to month 60. Of course the hypothetical scenario this estimand refers to accomplishes
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Figure 6: Parametric g-formula and IPW estimates of the risk of the composite outcome (based
on sums of corresponding estimates of the risk of prostate cancer death without elimination of
competing events and risk of other death) by follow-up month k + 1 = 1, . . . 60 under high-dose
Diethylstilbestrol versus placebo.
removal of the treatment’s effect on the competing event by eliminating the competing event (other
death). Therefore these estimates cannot be confirmed in any real-world study with an explicitly
defined protocol. The ill-defined nature of this effect, as we discussed in Section 6, makes violations
of required identifying assumptions likely. Here, the assumption that only covariates included in
L0 are sufficient to ensure exchangeability for censoring by death is particularly strong. Minimally,
given the long follow-up, bias might be mitigated by control for time-updated prognostic factors
for prostate cancer death that also affect death from other causes; this could potentially include
time-varying adherence to the DES treatment itself (see Section 9 for further discussion).
9 Discussion
In this paper, we used a counterfactual framework for causal inference to formally define classical
statistical estimands from the competing risks literature. When competing events are defined as
censoring events, a contrast in counterfactual risks of the event of interest quantifies a direct effect
of treatment on the event of interest that does not capture the treatment’s effect on the competing
event. Otherwise, it quantifies a total effect of treatment on this event that captures all causal
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Figure 7: Parametric g-formula estimates (35) and IPW estimates (36) of the risk of prostate cancer
death under elimination of competing events by follow-up month k + 1 = 1, . . . 60 under high-dose
Diethylstilbestrol versus placebo.
pathways between treatment and the event of interest.
We formalized conditions under which these total and direct effects may be identified. In par-
ticular, when the estimand is defined as a total effect, competing events are time-varying covariates
which are needed to ensure exchangeability, together with other baseline and time-varying covari-
ates, even in randomized trials. For both types of effects, we showed that identifying functions
coincide with different versions of Robins’s g-formula 1986. We linked these identification results to
various possible estimators of total and direct effects. Previous authors have argued that “...there
are no established rules for representing competing risks on a DAG.” [Lesko and Lau, 2017]. We
showed how exchangeability assumptions in this setting can be assessed on a causal diagram using
established graphical rules for identification [Pearl, 1995, Richardson and Robins, 2013].
We presented an application of some of these estimators to data from a trial of estrogen therapy
and prostate cancer death. As in many randomized trials, only baseline covariates were available,
which makes exchangeability assumptions less plausible [Herna´n and Robins, 2017, Herna´n and Herna´ndez-Dı´az,
2012]. We used an example of a randomized trial to motivate ideas but our results trivially extend
to observational studies in which treatment assignment is not randomized by the investigator.
While this paper highlighted the central role of the scientific question to determine whether
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a competing event is a censoring event, this choice does not uniquely apply to competing events.
Many other events observed during the course of a longitudinal study may involve such a choice.
For example, here we considered counterfactual outcomes indexed by interventions only on baseline
assignment to a given treatment strategy. Had, instead, we considered counterfactual outcomes
indexed by interventions resulting in sustained adherence to a given strategy, then failure to adhere
is a censoring event as this event precludes observation of this outcome.
We also considered three definitions of the hazard of the event of interest at a given time
under a counterfactual intervention on treatment. Two of these hazard definitions coincide with
the popular cause-specific and subdistribution hazards of the classic statistical literature. At odds
with previous recommendations advocating for the reporting of cause-specific hazard ratios when
interest is in “etiology” [Latouche et al., 2013, Austin et al., 2016, Lau et al., 2015], we clarified
that contrasts in any of these counterfactual hazards do not generally have a causal interpretation,
even when assumptions that give identification of these contrasts hold in the study. This failure of
causal interpretation occurs even when the restrictive assumptions that identify a direct effect on
the risk of the event of interest hold. In line with previous recommendations in the non-competing
risk setting [Herna´n et al., 2004, Herna´n, 2010], we do not recommend the routine use of any hazard
as a measure of causal effect when competing events exist due to these problems. However, as we
reviewed, many estimators of identifying functions for the total effect or direct effect for data with
censoring events involve estimating different types of observed hazards. In the case of total effects,
the choice to use methods that estimate (possibly weighted or conditional) observed cause-specific
or subdistribution hazards may impact model misspecification bias and precision but the target
causal estimand remains a total effect.
We clarified that a competing event generally acts as a mediator of the treatment effect on
the event of interest, leading to uncertain interpretation of the total effect. Therefore, except in
special cases where we are sure that there is no effect of the treatment on the competing event,
effects that quantify a treatment effect not capturing the treatment’s effect on the competing
event are attractive. We focused on one such effect, a controlled direct effect, that coincides with
a contrast in estimands historically considered in the statistical literature. As we discussed, the
direct effect (6) relies on ill-defined interventions on death and, in turn, requires strong assumptions
for identification in a real-world study. Other effect definitions that can quantify an effect of the
treatment not capturing the treatment’s effect on the competing event have been advocated in the
causal inference literature; in particular, the survivor average causal effect (SACE)[Rubin, 2000]
which quantifies the average causal effect of the treatment on the event of interest among the subset
of individuals in the study population who would never experience the competing event under any
level of treatment. While such an effect does not require conceptualizing ill-defined interventions
on death, it quantifies a treatment effect in an unknown subset of the study population because it
is only possible to observe an individual’s competing event status under a single level of treatment
(see Appendix D).
In conclusion, a counterfactual framework for causal inference elucidates choices in the anal-
ysis of failure time data with competing events. Such a framework allows explicit definition and
interpretation of causal treatment effects, consideration of the nature and strength of assumptions
needed to identify these effects in real-world studies and, therefore, guidance for the selection of
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statistical methods. Current options for defining a treatment effect on the event of interest that
does not capture the treatment’s effect on the competing event have significant drawbacks, either
requiring ill-defined interventions in the study population or well-defined interventions in an un-
knowable subpopulation. New effect definitions for evaluating treatment biological harm or benefit
on the event of interest that avoid these problems will be an essential component of future work.
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Appendix A Single-world intervention graphs
Richardson and Robins 2013 defined a graphical condition based on a d-separation [Pearl, 1995]
relation that gives general identification of a time-varying treatment effect by a particular g-formula
[Robins, 1986]. They further show that, given an appropriate consistency assumption, this graphical
condition for identification implies an exchangeability condition such as those in (19) or (25) of the
main text. Their d-separation condition is applied to a transformation of a causal DAG [Pearl,
1995] representing assumptions on the underlying data generating process that produced the data
in the observational study such as those in Figures 1 and 2 of the main text. Richardson and
Robins [Richardson and Robins, 2013] call this transformation a Single World Intervention Graph
(SWIG). We now illustrate how to evaluate identification of any of the counterfactual estimands in
Table 1 of the main text using SWIGs.
To evaluate identification of any of the estimands in Table 1 of the main text, the following
transformation is applied to the causal DAG representing the assumed underlying observed data
generating mechanism:
1. Split each intervention node into two nodes with one node containing the natural value of
the intervention variable (the value that would have been observed at k were the intervention
discontinued right before k [Robins et al., 2004, Richardson and Robins, 2013, Young et al.,
2014] ) and the other a fixed value under intervention. Intervention variables in our case are
treatment A and censoring at each time (with censoring nodes including loss to follow-up and
competing events or only loss to follow-up, depending on the estimand, as explained in the
main text).
2. Index all random variables after A as counterfactuals under the intervention, including the
natural values of the intervention variables.
3. All arrows originally out of the observed values of intervention variables on the original causal
DAG should now be out of the intervention value and all arrows into the observed values on
the original causal DAG should now be into the (counterfactual) natural value of that variable.
Consider an intervention that sets A to a and somehow eliminates loss to follow-up and compet-
ing events. Figure 8 is a SWIG template [Richardson and Robins, 2013], denoted G(a, c, d), which
is a transformation of the causal DAG in Figure 1. G(a, c, d) is a template because it corresponds
to any intervention where Ck+1,Dk+1 are set to fixed values cK+1, dK+1 ≡ c, d. We are interested
specifically in c = d = 0 (we consider the general template to reduce clutter on the graph) .
Define Aa as the value of treatment any individual would receive under an intervention that sets
A = a such that, by definition, Aa ≡ a for all individuals. Also define C
a,cj ,dj−1
j and D
a,cj ,dj
j as the
values of the censoring indicators at j under an intervention that sets (CK+1,DK+1) = (cK+1, dK+1)
such that, by definition, C
a,cj ,dj−1
j ≡ cj and D
a,cj ,dj
j ≡ dj for all individuals. Then, given the
consistency assumption (21) and for c = d = 0, exchangeability (19) is implied under the data
generating assumptions of the causal DAG in Figure 1 by the absence of any unblocked backdoor
paths on the SWIG template G(a, c, d) (Figure 8) between:
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Figure 8: A SWIG template G(a, c, d) derived from the causal DAG in Figure 1 which implies
exchangeability (19) holds.
Figure 9: A SWIG template G(a, c, d) derived from the causal DAG in Figure 2 which implies
exchangeability (19) fails.
1. the natural value of treatment A and future counterfactual outcomes Y
a,d,c
K+1 conditional on
L0
2. for any j = 0, . . . ,K, the natural value of the loss to follow-up indicator C
a,cj ,dj
j+1 and future
counterfactual outcomes Y
a,dj+1,cj+1
j+1 conditional on (L
a,cj=dj
j , Y
a,cj ,dj
j ,D
a,cj ,dj
j ≡ dj ,D
a,cj ,dj−1
j , C
a,cj ,dj−1
j ≡
cj , C
a,cj−1,dj−1
j , A
a ≡ a,A)
3. for any j = 0, . . . ,K, the natural value of the competing event indicator D
a,cj+1,dj
j+1 and future
counterfactual outcomes Y
a,dj+1,cj+1
j+1 conditional on (L
a,cj=dj
j , Y
a,cj ,dj
j ,D
a,cj ,dj
j ≡ dj ,D
a,cj ,dj−1
j , C
a,cj+1,dj
j+1 ≡
cj+1, C
a,cj ,dj
j+1 , A
a ≡ a,A)
By contrast, Figure 9 alternatively shows the the SWIG template G(a, c, d) derived from the causal
DAG in Figure 2 under which the event of interest and competing event share an unmeasured
common cause U . Now, for example, condition 3. fails by the unblocked backdoor path Dak ← U →
Y
a,dk
k that remains even after conditioning on A
a ≡ a,A,L0.
Now consider an intervention that sets A to a and somehow eliminates only loss to follow-up
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Figure 10: A SWIG template G(a, c) derived from the causal DAG in Figure 2 which implies
exchangeability (25) holds.
but not competing events. Figure 10 is a SWIG template G(a, c) that is a transformation of the
causal DAG in Figure 2 for an intervention where Ck+1 are set to fixed values. Again, we are
interested specifically in c = 0 (using the general template only to reduce clutter on the graph).
In this case, define C
a,cj
j as the value of the censoring indicator at j under an intervention
that sets CK+1 = cK+1 such that, by definition, C
a,cj
j ≡ cj for all individuals. Then, given the
consistency assumption (27) and for c = 0, exchangeability (25) is implied under the data generating
assumptions of the causal DAG in Figure 2 by the absence of any unblocked backdoor paths on the
SWIG template G(a, c) (Figure 10) between:
1. the natural value of treatment A and future counterfactual outcomes Y
a,c
K+1 conditional on
L0
2. for any j = 0, . . . ,K, the natural value of the loss to follow-up indicator C
a,cj
j+1 and future
counterfactual outcomes Y
a,cj+1
j+1 conditional on (L
a,cj
j , Y
a,cj
j ,D
a,cj
j , C
a,cj
j ≡ cj , C
a,cj−1
j , A
a ≡
a,A)
Appendix B Identification Proofs
For simplicity and without loss of generality, in this section take L0 to be a constant (i.e. we
consider a population restricted to one level of L0) and thus all estimands and assumptions can be
implicitly interpreted as conditional on L0).
Theorem 1 Suppose the following identifying assumptions hold:
1. Exchangeability:
Y
a,v=0
K+1
∐
A,
Y
a,v=0
k+1
∐
Vk+1|Xk = xk, Y k = V k = 0, A = a (40)
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2. Positivity:
fA,Xk ,Vk,Yk(a, xk, 0, 0) 6= 0 =⇒
Pr[Vk+1 = 0|Xk = xk, Vk = Yk = 0, A = a] > 0 w.p.1. (41)
3. Consistency:
If A = a and V k+1 = 0,
then Xk+1 = X
a,v=0
k+1 and Y k+1 = Y
a,v=0
k+1 (42)
with Vk+1 a vector of censoring indicators including all sources of censoring by k+1 (with V0 ≡ 0)
and Xk a vector of measured time-varying covariates at k. Then Pr[Y
a,v=0
K+1 = 1], the counterfactual
risk under a and elimination of censoring, is equivalent to
∑
xK
K∑
k=0
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Xk = xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
{Pr[Yj = 0|X j−1 = xj−1, V j = Y j−1 = 0, A = a]×
f(xj|xj−1, V j = Y j = 0, a)} (43)
Proof: For k = 0, . . . ,K and Y a,v=0K+1 ≡ Y
a,v=0, if f(Xk, Vk = Yk = 0, a) 6= 0 then define
ba,v=0(K,Xk) = Pr[Y
a,v=0 = 0|Xk, V k = Y k = 0, a]. For V0 ≡ Y0 ≡ 0 and X0 a constant as
assumed for simplicity in main text, we have ba,v=0(K,X0) = Pr[Y
a,v=0 = 0|A = a]. By (40), we
further have ba,v=0(K,X0) = Pr[Y
a,v=0 = 0].
The event Y a,v=0 = 0 implies Y a,v=0k = 0, k = 0, . . . ,K. Therefore, b
a,v=0(K,Xk) = Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+1 , . . . , Y
a,v=0
K+1 =
0|Xk, V k = Y k = 0, a] for any k.
By (40) and (41)
ba,v=0(K,Xk) = Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+1 , . . . , Y
a,v=0
K+1 = 0|Xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a]
Further by (42) and laws of probability
ba,v=0(K,Xk) = Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+2 , . . . , Y
a,v=0
K+1 = 0|Xk, V k+1 = Y k+1 = 0, a]
× Pr[Yk+1 = 0|Xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a]
=
∑
xk+1
Pr[Y a,v=0k+2 , . . . , Y
a,v=0
K+1 = 0|Xk+1 = xk+1,Xk, V k+1 = Y k+1 = 0, a]
× Pr[Yk+1 = 0|Xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a]f(xk+1|Xk, V k+1 = Y k+1 = 0, a)
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By another invocation of (40) and (41)
ba,v=0(K,Xk) =
∑
xk+1
Pr[Y a,v=0k+2 , . . . , Y
a,v=0
K+1 = 0|Xk+1 = xk+1,Xk, V k+2 = Y k+1 = 0, a]
× Pr[Yk+1 = 0|Xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a]f(xk+1|Xk, V k+1 = Y k+1 = 0, a)
Arguing iteratively, for k = 0, . . . ,K we have
ba,v=0(K,Xk) =
∑
xk+1
. . .
∑
xK
Pr[Y a,v=0K+1 = 0|Xk+1 = xk+1, . . . ,XK = xK ,Xk, V K+1 = Y K = 0, a]
× Pr[Yk+1 = 0|Xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a], . . . ,
× Pr[YK = 0|Xk+1 = xk+1, . . . ,XK−1 = xk−1,Xk, V K = Y K−1 = 0, a]
× f(xk+1|Xk, V k+1 = Y k+1 = 0, a), . . . , f(xK |xk+1, . . . , xK−1,Xk, V K = Y K = 0, a)
Setting k = 0, noting that Y0 ≡ 0 by definition, and invoking consistency (42) once more we
have
ba,v=0(K,X0) =
∑
xK
Pr[YK+1 = 0|XK = xK , V K+1 = Y K = 0, a]
K∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Xj−1 = xj−1, V j = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(xj |xj−1, V j = Y j = 0, a)
The result follows by noting that the complement of ba,v=0(K,X0) is equal to (43).
Corollary 1 Given (19) , (20) and (21), the counterfactual risk under elimination of competing
events (5) equals the g-formula (22).
Proof: The result follows from Theorem 1 by choosing V K+1 = (CK+1,DK+1) and XK = LK .
Corollary 2 Given (25) , (26) and (27), the counterfactual risk without elimination of competing
events (7) equals the g-formula (28).
Proof: Assumptions (25) , (26) and (27) are special cases of (40) , (41) and (42) choosing V K+1 =
CK+1 and XK = (LK ,DK). By Theorem 1, given these assumptions we have that Pr[Y
a,c=0
K+1 = 0]
equals ∑
lK
∑
dK
Pr[YK+1 = 0|LK = lK ,DK = dK , CK+1 = Y K = 0, a]
K∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1,Dj−1 = dj−1, Cj = Y j−1 = 0, a]
× f(lj, dj |lj−1, dj−1, Cj = Y j = 0, a)
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which, by laws of probability, can be equivalently written as:∑
lK
∑
dK
Pr[YK+1 = 0|LK = lK ,DK = dK , CK+1 = Y K = 0, a]
K∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1,Dj = dj , Cj = Y j−1 = 0, a]
× Pr[Dj = dj |lj−1, dj−1Cj = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(lj |lj−1, dj, Cj = Y j = 0, a)
=∑
lK
∑
dK+1
Pr[YK+1 = 0,DK+1 = dK+1|LK = lK ,DK = dK , CK+1 = Y K = 0, a]
K∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1,Dj = dj , Cj = Y j−1 = 0, a]
× Pr[Dj = dj |lj−1, dj−1Cj = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(lj |lj−1, dj, Cj = Y j = 0, a)
=∑
lK
∑
dK+1
Pr[YK+1 = 0|LK = lK ,DK+1 = dK+1, CK+1 = Y K = 0, a]
K∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1,Dj = dj , Cj = Y j−1 = 0, a]
× Pr[Dj+1 = dj+1|lj, djCj+1 = Y j = 0, a]f(lj |lj−1, dj, Cj = Y j = 0, a)
The last expression is the complement of (28).
Lemma 1 Defining
hv=0k (a) =
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k ]A = a]
(44)
and
W Vk =
k∏
j=0
I(Vj+1 = 0)
Pr[Vj+1 = 0|Xj , V j = Y j = 0, A = a]
(45)
we have, for k = 0, . . . ,K,
hv=0k (a)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− hv=0j (a)
]
=
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
k∏
j=1
E[(1− Yj−1)W
V
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1− Yj−1)W
V
j−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yj)W
V
j |A = a]
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Proof: For some 0 ≤ t < k − 1, by (44) we have
hv=0k (a)
k−1∏
j=t
[
1− hv=0j (a)
]
=
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
×
{
1−
E[Yk(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
}
× . . .×
{
1−
E[Yt+1(1− Yt)W
V
t |A = a]
E[(1 − Yt)W Vt |A = a]
}
=
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
×
{
E[(1 − Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]− E[Yk(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
}
× . . .×
{
E[(1− Yt)W
V
t |A = a]− E[Yt+1(1− Yt)W
V
t |A = a]
E[(1− Yt)W Vt |A = a]
}
=
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]×
{
E[(1 − Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]− E[Yk(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
}
×
{
E[(1− Yk−2)W
V
k−2|A = a]− E[Yk−1(1− Yk−2)W
V
k−2|A = a]
E[(1 − Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
}
× . . .×
{
E[(1− Yt)W
V
t |A = a]− E[Yt+1(1− Yt)W
V
t |A = a]
E[(1 − Yt+1)W Vt+1|A = a]
}
×
1
E[(1− Yt)W Vt |A = a]
=
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]


k∏
j=t+1
E[(1− Yj−1)W
V
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1− Yj−1)W
V
j−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yj)W Vj |A = a]

×
1
E[(1 − Yt)W Vt |A = a]
Our result follows by setting t = 0 and noting that E[(1− Y0)W
V
0 |A = a] = 1.
Lemma 2 For k = 0, . . . ,K and W Vk as in (45)
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a] = E[(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]− E[Yk(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
Proof: By laws of expectation
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a] =
E
[
(1− Yk)W
V
k−1E
[
I(Vk+1 = 0)
Pr[Vk+1 = 0|Xk, V k = Y k = 0, A = a]
|Xk, V k, Y k
]
|A = a
]
=
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k−1|A = a]
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As the event Yk = 0 implies the joint event (Yk = 0, Yk−1 = 0) we have
E[(1 − Yk)W
V
k−1|A = a] = E[(1− Yk)(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a] =
E[(1 − Yk−1)W
V
k−1 − Yk(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a] =
E[(1 − Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]− E[Yk(1− Yk−1)W
V
k−1|A = a]
Lemma 3 For each k = 0, . . . ,K
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a] =∑
xk
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Xk = xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a]×
k∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Xj−1 = xj−1, V j = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(xj |xj−1, V j = Y j = 0, a) (46)
and
E[(1 − Yk)W
V
k |A = a] =∑
xk−1
Pr[Yk = 0|Xk−1 = xk−1, V k = Y k−1 = 0, a]×
k−1∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Xj−1 = xj−1, V j = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(xj |xj−1, V j = Y j = 0, a) (47)
Proof: By definition we have
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a] =∑
yk+1
∑
xk
∑
vk+1
yk+1(1− yk)
k∏
j=0
(1− vj+1)
Pr[Vj+1 = 0|xj , V j = Y j = 0, A = a]
f(yj+1|yj , xj , vj+1, a)
f(vj+1|yj, xj , vj, a)f(xj |yj , vj , xj−1, a)
The result (46) follows by noting that any component of the above sum will be zero when yk+1 = 0,
yj = 1 or vj+1 = 1, j = 0, . . . , k. Analogous arguments prove (47).
Theorem 2 Expression (43) equals
K∑
k=0
hv=0k (a)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− hv=0j (a)
]
(48)
Proof: By Lemma 1, we can rewrite (48) as
K∑
k=0
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
k∏
j=1
E[(1 − Yj−1)W
V
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1− Yj−1)W
V
j−1|A = a]
E[(1 − Yj)W
V
j |A = a]
43
which, by Lemma 2, reduces to
K∑
k=0
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
The result then follows from Lemma 3.
Corollary 3 The g-formula (22) equals expression (23).
The result follows from Theorem 2 by choosing V K+1 = (CK+1,DK+1) and XK = LK .
Corollary 4 The g-formula (28) equals expression (30).
The result follows from Theorem 2 by choosing V K+1 = CK+1 and XK = (LK ,DK).
Lemma 4 Given the definitions (33) and (34) in the main text:
h1k(a){1 − h
2
k(a)}
k−1∏
j=t
[{1− h1j (a)}{1 − h
2
j (a)}] =
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]×
k∏
j=0
E[(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]− E[Dj+1(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
E[(1−Dj+1)(1 − Yj)W
C
j |A = a]
×
k∏
j=1
E[(1−Dj)(1− Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1−Dj)(1 − Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
44
Proof: For some 0 ≤ t < k − 1 by (33) and (34) in the main text we have
h1k(a){1 − h
2
k(a)}
k−1∏
j=t
[{1− h1j (a)}{1 − h
2
j (a)}] =
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
{
1−
E[Dk+1(1− Yk)(1−Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[(1− Yk)(1−Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
}
×{
1−
E[Yk(1−Dk)(1 − Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
E[(1−Dk)(1− Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
}{
1−
E[Dk(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
}
× . . .×
{
1−
E[Yt+1(1−Dt+1)(1− Yt)W
C
t |A = a]
E[(1−Dt+1)(1 − Yt)WCt |A = a]
}{
1−
E[Dt+1(1− Yt)(1−Dt)W
C
t |A = a]
E[(1− Yt)(1 −Dt)WCt |A = a]
}
=
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
×
E[(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]− E[Dk+1(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
×
E[(1−Dk)(1− Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]− E[Yk(1 −Dk)(1 − Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
E[(1−Dk)(1 − Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
×
E[(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]− E[Dk(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
E[(1 − Yk−1)(1 −Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
× . . .×
E[(1−Dt+1)(1− Yt)W
C
t |A = a]− E[Yt+1(1−Dt+1)(1 − Yt)W
C
t |A = a]
E[(1−Dt+1)(1 − Yt)WCt |A = a]
×
E[(1− Yt)(1 −Dt)W
C
t |A = a]− E[Dt+1(1− Yt)(1 −Dt)W
C
t |A = a]
E[(1− Yt)(1−Dt)W
C
t |A = a]
=
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]×
E[(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]− E[Dk+1(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
E[(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
C
k |A = a]
×
E[(1−Dk)(1− Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]− E[Yk(1 −Dk)(1 − Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yk)(1 −Dk)W
C
k |A = a]
×
E[(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]− E[Dk(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
E[(1 −Dk)(1− Yk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
×
E[(1−Dk−1)(1− Yk−2)W
C
k−2|A = a]− E[Yk−1(1−Dk−1)(1− Yk−2)W
C
k−2|A = a]
E[(1− Yk−1)(1−Dk−1)W
C
k−1|A = a]
× . . .×
E[(1−Dt+1)(1− Yt)W
C
t |A = a]− E[Yt+1(1−Dt+1)(1 − Yt)W
C
t |A = a]
E[(1− Yt+1)(1−Dt+1)WCt+1|A = a]
×
E[(1− Yt)(1 −Dt)W
C
t |A = a]− E[Dt+1(1− Yt)(1 −Dt)W
C
t |A = a]
E[(1−Dt+1)(1 − Yt)WCt |A = a]
×
1
E[(1− Yt)(1 −Dt)WCt |A = a] 45
Thus
h1k(a){1 − h
2
k(a)}
k−1∏
j=t
[{1 − h1j(a)}{1 − h
2
j (a)}] =
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1 − Yk)W
C
k |A = a]×
k∏
j=t
E[(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j |A = a]− E[Dj+1(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
E[(1 −Dj+1)(1 − Yj)W
C
j |A = a]
×
k∏
j=t+1
E[(1 −Dj)(1 − Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1−Dj)(1 − Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
×
1
E[(1 − Yt)(1−Dt)WCt |A = a]
The result follows by setting t = 0 and noting E[(1− Y0)(1−D0)W
C
0 |A = a] = 1
Lemma 5 For any follow-up interval j
E[(1−Dj+1)(1−Yj)W
C
j |A = a] = E[(1−Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]−E[Dj+1(1−Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
and
E[(1−Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a] = E[(1−Dj)(1−Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]−E[Yj(1−Dj)(1−Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]
Proof: The event (Dj+1 = Yj = 0) implies the event (Dj+1 = Yj = Dj = 0). Therefore
E[(1 −Dj+1)(1 − Yj)W
C
j |A = a] = E[(1−Dj+1)(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a] =
E[(1 − Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j −Dj+1(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a] =
E[(1 − Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]− E[Dj+1(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
Also
E[(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a] =
E
[
(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j−1
I(Cj+1 = 0)
Pr[Cj+1 = 0|Lj, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, A = a]
|A = a
]
=
E
[
E
[
(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j−1
I(Cj+1 = 0)
Pr[Cj+1 = 0|Lj, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, A = a]
|Lj, Cj,Dj, Y j
]
|A = a
]
=
E
[
(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j−1E
[
I(Cj+1 = 0)
Pr[Cj+1 = 0|Lj, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, A = a]
|Lj, Cj,Dj, Y j
]
|A = a
]
=
E
[
(1− Yj)(1 −Dj)W
C
j−1|A = a
]
Further, the event (Yj = Dj = 0) implies the event (Yj = Dj = Yj−1 = 0) such that
E[(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j−1|A = a] = E[(1− Yj)(1−Dj)(1− Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a] =
E[(1−Dj)(1− Yj−1)W
C
j−1 − Yj(1−Dj)(1 − Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a] =
E[(1−Dj)(1− Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1−Dj)(1 − Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]
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Theorem 3 The g-formula (29) is equivalent to expression (32).
Proof: By Lemma 4, we can write (32) as
K∑
k=0
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1 − Yk)W
C
k |A = a]×
k∏
j=0
E[(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]− E[Dj+1(1− Yj)(1−Dj)W
C
j |A = a]
E[(1 −Dj+1)(1 − Yj)W
C
j |A = a]
×
k∏
j=1
E[(1−Dj)(1− Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]− E[Yj(1−Dj)(1 − Yj−1)W
C
j−1|A = a]
E[(1− Yj)(1−Dj)WCj |A = a]
(49)
By Lemma 5, (49) reduces to
K∑
k=0
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1 − Yk)W
C
k |A = a] (50)
For each index k in the sum in (50) we have
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1 − Yk)W
C
k |A = a] =∑
yk+1
∑
dk+1
∑
ck+1
∑
lk
yk+1(1− dk+1)(1− yk)
k∏
j=0
I(Cj+1 = 0)
Pr[Cj+1 = 0|Lj = lj , Cj = Y j = Dj = 0, A = a]
×
k∏
j=0
f(yj+1|yj , dj+1, cj+1, lj, a)f(dj+1|yj , dj , cj+1, lj, a)f(cj+1|yj, dj, cj , lj, a)×
f(lj |yj, dj , cj , lj−1, a) =∑
lk
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Lk = lk, Ck+1 = Y k = Dk+1 = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj = Y j−1 = Dj = 0, A = a]×
Pr[Dj+1 = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj+1 = Y j = Dj = 0, A = a]×
f(lj |Y j = Dj = Cj = 0, lj−1, a)
Corollary 5 Suppose (40), (41), and (42) hold. Then Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,v=0
k = 0] is equivalent to
(44) for any k = 0, . . . ,K.
Proof: By laws of probability we have
Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1|Y
a,v=0
k = 0] =
Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1, Y
a,v=0
k = 0]
Pr[Y a,v=0k = 0]
(51)
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Also
Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1, Y
a,v=0
k = 0] + Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+1 = 1, Y
a,v=0
k = 1] = Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+1 = 1]
Because the event (Y a,v=0k+1 = 1, Y
a,v=0
k = 1) is equivalent to the event Y
a,v=0
k = 1 we have
Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1, Y
a,v=0
k = 0] + Pr[Y
a,v=0
k = 1] = Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+1 = 1]
such that the numerator of (51) is equivalent to
Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1, Y
a,v=0
k = 0] = Pr[Y
a,v=0
k+1 = 1]− Pr[Y
a,v=0
k = 1] (52)
which, by Theorem 1 is equivalent to
Pr[Y a,v=0k+1 = 1]− Pr[Y
a,v=0
k = 1] =
k∑
j=0
∑
xj
Pr[Yj+1 = 1|Xj = xj, V j+1 = Y j = 0, a]×
j∏
s=0
Pr[Ys = 0|Xs−1 = xs−1, V s = Y s−1 = 0, a]f(xs|xs−1, V s = Y s = 0, a)−
k−1∑
j=0
∑
xj
Pr[Yj+1 = 1|Xj = xj, V j+1 = Y j = 0, a]×
j∏
s=0
Pr[Ys = 0|Xs−1 = xs−1, V s = Y s−1 = 0, a]f(xs|xs−1, V s = Y s = 0, a) =
∑
xk
Pr[Yk+1 = 1|Xk = xk, V k+1 = Y k = 0, a]×
k∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|X j−1 = xj−1, V j = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(xj |xj−1, V j = Y j = 0, a) =
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a] (53)
with the last equality by Lemma 3. Also by Theorem 1, the denominator of (51) is equivalent to∑
xk−1
Pr[Yk = 0|Xk−1 = xk−1, V k = Y k−1 = 0, a]×
k−1∏
j=0
Pr[Yj = 0|Xj−1 = xj−1, V j = Y j−1 = 0, a]f(xj |xj−1, V j = Y j = 0, a) =
E[(1− Yk)W
V
k |A = a]
with the last equality by Lemma 3.
Corollary 6 Given (19), (20), and (21), the counterfactual hazard under elimination of competing
events (12) is equivalent to expression (24) for any k = 0, . . . ,K.
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Proof: The result follows from Corollary 5 by choosing V K+1 = (CK+1,DK+1) and XK = LK .
Corollary 7 Given (25), (26), and (27), the counterfactual hazard without elimination of compet-
ing events (13) is equivalent to expression (31) for any k = 0, . . . ,K.
Proof: The result follows from Corollary 5 by choosing V K+1 = CK+1 and XK = (DK , LK).
Corollary 8 Suppose the following identifying assumptions hold:
1. Exchangeability:
D
a,c=0
K+1
∐
A,
D
a,c=0
k+1
∐
Ck+1|Lk = lk,Dk = Ck = 0, A = a (54)
2. Positivity:
fA,Lk,Ck,Dk(a, lk, 0, 0) 6= 0 =⇒
Pr[Ck+1 = 0|Lk = lk, Ck = Dk = 0, A = a] > 0 w.p.1. (55)
3. Consistency:
If A = a and Ck+1 = 0,
then Lk+1 = L
a,c=0
k+1 and Dk+1 = D
a,c=0
k+1 (56)
allowing Y k to be an implicit component of Lk. Then Pr[D
a,c=0
K+1 = 1], the counterfactual risk of the
competing event by K + 1 under a and elimination of loss to follow-up, is equivalent to
∑
lK
K∑
k=0
Pr[Dk+1 = 1|Lk = lk, Ck+1 = Dk = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
{Pr[Dj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj = Dj−1 = 0, A = a]×
f(lj|lj−1, Cj = Dj = 0, a)} (57)
Proof: The result follows from Theorem 1 by replacing Y k+1, V k+1, Xk and corresponding counter-
factuals from Theorem 1 with Dk+1,Ck+1, Lk and their corresponding counterfactuals, respectively.
Remark: Note that Corollary 8 is agnostic as to whether the event of interest and the competing
event are mutually competing events or whether a semi-competing risks setting applies. In the
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special case of mutually competing events, separating Y k from Lk, the g-formula 57 can be more
explicitly written as
∑
lK
K∑
k=0
Pr[Dk+1 = 1|Lk = lk, Ck+1 = Dk = Y k = 0, A = a]×
k∏
j=0
{Pr[Dj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj = Dj−1 = Y j−1 = 0, A = a]×
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j−1 = 0, A = a]×
f(lj|lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, a)} (58)
Corollary 9 Suppose that the assumptions (54), (55), (56), (25), (26) and (27) all simultane-
ously hold. Then the counterfactual hazard conditioned on competing events (14) is equivalent to
expression (33) for any k = 0, . . . ,K.
Proof: By probability rules
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1|D
a,c=0
k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0] =
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1,D
a,c=0
k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0]
Pr[Da,c=0k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0]
(59)
Because the event Yk+1 = 1 implies Dk+1 = 0 under any single counterfactual world and by (52)
and (53) of Corollary 5, we have that the numerator of (59) is equivalent to
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1,D
a,c=0
k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0] =
Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1, Y
a,c=0
k = 0] =
E[Yk+1(1− Yk)W
c=0
k |A = a] =
E[Yk+1(1−Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
c=0
k |A = a]
Also, by Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, replacing the event Y a,c=0k+1 = 0 with the joint event (D
a,c=0
k+1 =
0, Y a,c=0k = 0), we can write the denominator of (59) as
Pr[Da,c=0k+1 = Y
a,c=0
k = 0] =
∑
lk
k∏
j=0
Pr[Dj+1 = 0|Lj = lj, Cj+1 = Y j = Dj = 0, a]
Pr[Yj = 0|Lj−1 = lj−1Cj = Y j−1 = Dj = 0, a]f(lj |lj−1, Cj = Dj = Y j = 0, a) =
E[(1 −Dk+1)(1− Yk)W
c=0
k |A = a]
with the last equality following arguments similar to Lemma 3.
Similar arguments prove the counterfactual hazard of the competing event itself (18) is equiv-
alent to expression (34) given (54), (55), (56), (25), (26) and (27).
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Appendix C Estimators of the risk of the competing event itself
and data application implementation details
C.1 Parametric g-formula and IPW estimators of the risk of the competing
event
Parametric g-formula or IPW estimators of the risk of the competing event Pr[Da,c=0K+1 = 1] as in (9)
can be obtained using nearly identical algorithms reviewed in Section 7.2 when events are mutually
competing. Under our temporal order assumptions within each interval, a parametric g-formula
estimator of the risk of the competing event itself by K + 1 as identified by 58 and adjusting only
for L0 is analogously a function of the estimated observed cause-specific hazards of the event of
interest and competing event:
1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
q(a, l0i, k; ηˆ)
k−1∏
j=0
[
1− p(a, l0i, j; θˆ)
]
[1− q(a, l0i, j; ηˆ)] (60)
Alternatively, an IPW estimator based on weighted estimates of these cause-specific hazards is
K∑
k=0
hˆ2k(a; αˆ)
k−1∏
j=0
[{1− hˆ1j (a; αˆ)}{1 − hˆ
2
j (a; αˆ)}] (61)
Finally, an IPW estimator based on estimating observed subdistribution hazards is as in (38) of
the main text but treating the original competing event as the event of interest and the original
event of interest as the competing event. For semi-competing risk settings (e.g. when the original
event of interest is diagnosis of prostate cancer), there are no competing events for the purposes
of estimating the risk of the competing event . In this case, the original competing event will act
as the event of interest Yk+1, time-varying status of the original event of interest may act as a
component of Lk (if it is needed to ensure exchangeability (54) under the assumptions encoded in
the causal diagram) and Dk+1 ≡ 0 at all k. Here, methods of Section 7.1 can be used with the
competing event status simply set to 0 for all individuals at all times; in other words, methods for
settings where competing events do not exist can be used.
C.2 Data application implementation details
This section gives implementation details for each estimator used in the data analysis described in
Section 8.
C.2.1 Structure of input data sets
Data set 1: The same input data set was used for 1) the parametric g-formula estimators (35)
and (37), 2) the IPW estimators based on cause-specific hazards (36) and (39) for direct and total
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effects on the event of interest, and 3) the parametric g-formula and IPW estimators (60) and (61)
for the total effect on the competing event. This input data set was constructed as a person-time
data set such that each person has K∗ + 1 lines indexed by k = 0, . . . ,K∗ and measurements of
(L0, A,Ck+1,Dk+1, Yk+1) on each line k. Individuals surviving all causes and not lost to follow-up
through the 5-year follow-up have K∗ + 1 = 60 records in the data. An individual experiencing
one of these events prior to month 60 will have K∗+1 < 60 records with K∗+1 the month of this
event.
Data set 2: A different input data set was used for the IPW estimator based on subdistribution
hazards (38) used for the total effect on the event of interest. Unlike the data set above, this data
set keeps individuals in the data set after occurrence of the competing event (i.e. keeps them in the
“risk set”). This dataset was also constructed as a person-time data set such that each person will
have K∗+1 lines indexed by k = 0, . . . ,K∗ and measurements of (L0, A,Ck+1,Dk+1, Yk+1) on each
line k. Individuals surviving all causes and not lost to follow-up through the five-year follow-up
or individuals experiencing a competing event within this period have K∗ + 1 = 60 records in the
data. An individual experiencing prostate cancer death or loss to follow-up prior to month 60 will
have K∗ + 1 < 60 records with K∗ + 1 the month of this event.
Data set 3: A third input data set was used for the IPW estimator based on subdistribution
hazards for the total effect on the competing event. This was constructed in the same way as data
set 2 but treating the original competing event as the event of interest and treating the original
event of interest as the competing event.
C.2.2 Model assumptions
For estimators implemented using data set 1:
We fit a pooled over time logistic regression model for the observed cause-specific hazard of
prostate cancer death (the event of interest) in each month k + 1, pk(a, l0, k; θ), with dependent
variable Yk+1 and independent variables a third degree polynomial function of month k + 1, treat-
ment status A, interactions between A and the terms for month, and the following function of L0:
activity level (normal versus reduced activity function), indicators of age group (≤ 59, 60 − 75,
≥ 75) , hemoglobin level (< 12 versus ≥ 12), and an indicator of previous history of cardiovascular
disease.
We similarly fit a pooled over time logistic regression model for the observed cause-specific
hazard of other death (the competing event) in each month k + 1, qk(a, l0, k; η) with dependent
variable Dk+1 and independent variables a second degree polynomial function of month, treatment
status A, and the following function of L0: activity level (normal versus reduced activity function),
indicators of age group (≤ 59, 60−75, ≥ 75) , hemoglobin level (< 12 versus ≥ 12), and an indicator
of previous history of cardiovascular disease. Note this less flexible model for the observed hazard of
other death compared with our model for the observed hazard of prostate cancer death was chosen
after several bootstrap samples for the construction of confidence intervals failed to converge under
the more flexible model for the other death hazard (using the same independent variables as for the
prostate cancer death model). We did construct point estimates under the more and less flexible
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model for the other death hazard as a sensitivity analysis which were very similar.
No patient was loss to follow-up in this study prior to k = 50. Therefore, we set estimates of
the loss to follow-up hazard, r(a, l0, k; αˆ) ≡ r(k) ≡ 1, for all k < 50 in the weight denominators for
all IPW estimators. For records with index k ≥ 50, we fit a pooled over time logistic regression
model for the loss to follow-up hazard at these times r(a, l0, k;α) with dependent variable Ck+1 and
independent variables treatment status A and the following function of L0: activity level (normal
versus reduced activity function), indicators of age group (≤ 59, 60 − 75, ≥ 75), and an indicator
of previous history of cardiovascular disease. Hemoglobin was originally included in this model but
was ultimately excluded in the final analysis as it resulted in failure of model convergence in several
bootstrap samples. We constructed point estimates under a more flexible model that additionally
included hemoglobin level (< 12 versus ≥ 12) as a sensitivity analysis and these were similar..
For estimators implemented using data sets 2 or 3: For these estimators, only a model for the
loss to follow-up hazard (amongst those previously surviving all causes) is required. As for esti-
mators based on data set 1, and for individuals still surviving the competing event by k, we set
this hazard to 1 for all k < 50 and fit the same pooled over time logistic regression model for
the loss to follow-up hazard for k ≥ 50 r(a, l0, k;α). We refit this model in data set 2 (and 3) so
programs could be standalone (although the predicted values obtained from data set 1 for the other
estimators alternatively could have been saved and used). To refit these models to data set 2 (or
3), the model fit must be explicitly restricted to records such that failure from the competing event
has not yet occurred because these data sets keep failed individuals in the risk set after failure. For
individuals who have failed from the competing event by k, we set the loss to follow-up hazard to
1 (because once an individual experiences the competing event, he cannot subsequently be lost to
follow-up).
Appendix D Cross-world alternatives to controlled direct effects
We have focused our attention in this paper on single-world counterfactual estimands [Richardson and Robins,
2013]. In particular, all of the counterfactual risks and hazards considered in Section 4 could be
identified (and, in turn, estimated) in a study where A is randomized at baseline and censoring
is eliminated. Of course, when censoring events include competing events as in the case of the
direct effect (6), a controlled direct effect, it is unclear how such a randomized study could be
implemented.
A principal stratum effect[Robins, 1986, Frangakis and Rubin, 2002] is an alternative to a con-
trolled direct effect that quantities a causal effect of the treatment on the event of interest that
does not capture the treatment’s effect on the competing event. Specifically, the survivor average
causal effect (SACE) [Rubin, 2000] on the risk of the event of interest by k + 1 can be written as
Pr[Y a=1,c=0k+1 = 1|D
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 0,D
a=1c=0
k+1 = 0]− Pr[Y
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 1|D
a=0,c=0
k+1 = 0,D
a=1c=0
k+1 = 0] (62)
The estimand (62) is nearly equivalent to the total effect (8). The only distinction is that the
effect (62) generally corresponds to a different population than the original study population. It is
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restricted to the subset of individuals who would not experience the competing event by k+1 under
either level of treatment A. As no individual in this subpopulation will experience a competing
event by this time, the effect (62) does not require conceptualizing interventions on the competing
event as in the case of the controlled direct effect (6); in turn, competing events are not censoring
events relative to the estimand (62).
Several authors have given identifying assumptions and corresponding estimators for point
estimates or bounds for the SACE [Tchetgen Tchetgen, 2014, Pearl, 2000, Shepherd et al., 2006,
Zhang and Rubin, 2003, Gilbert and Jin, 2010, Chiba and VanderWeele, 2011, Imai, 2008, Hayden et al.,
2005, Zhang et al., 2009, Ding et al., 2011, Nolen and Hudgens, 2011]. However, a major drawback
of this estimand is that, even in cases where such assumptions hold, we do not know which or how
large a subset of the population constitutes this principal stratum of survivors even in a study with
A randomized and no censoring. For example, for those with A = 1 we can never observe Da=0,c=0k+1 .
Natural direct effects [Robins and Greenland, 1992, Pearl, 2001] constitute another way to
define the causal effect of a treatment on an outcome that does not capture the treatment’s effect
on the mediator. The natural direct effect of treatment assignment A on the risk of the event of
interest by k + 1 that does not capture the treatment’s effect on the competing event (under an
intervention that eliminates loss to follow-up) can be defined as
Pr[Y
a=1,c=0,D
a=0
k+1
k+1 = 1] vs. Pr[Y
a=0,c=0,D
a=0
k+1
k+1 = 1] (63)
The right hand side of (63) is the risk of the event of interest by k + 1 had we intervened on all
individuals in the study population to set A = 0, eliminate loss to follow-up and set the history of
the competing event to the values it would take had we set A = 0; this is equivalent to the (single-
world) risk without elimination of competing events Pr[Y a,c=0k+1 = 1] as in (7) for a = 0. However, the
left hand side of (63) is the risk of the event of interest by k+1 had we intervened on all individuals
in the study population to set A = 1, eliminate loss to follow-up and set the history of the competing
event to the values it would have taken had we set A = 0. There is no circumstance in which we can
identify the right hand side of (63) without untestable assumptions because we can never observe
D
a=0
K+1 once A has been set to 1. Unlike the controlled direct effect, the natural direct effect has
an indirect analogue that sums to the total effect[Robins and Greenland, 1992, Vanderweele, 2015].
Also, unlike the SACE and like the controlled direct effect, the natural direct effect quantifies an
effect in the original (known) study population. However, like the controlled direct effect, the
natural direct effect also requires conceptualizing intervention on competing events and requires
even stronger assumptions for identification[Robins and Greenland, 1992, Vanderweele, 2015].
Remark: As we clarified in the main text, when the outcome corresponds to an indicator of
failure from an event of interest by k + 1, a competing event such as death prior to k + 1 does not
result in an undefined value for the outcome but rather a zero value. There, we can define a total
effect in this case. In alternative settings, where the outcome corresponds to a characteristic of an
individual at a particular time that is only defined while he is alive (e.g. blood pressure at time
k+1), then death prior to k+1 renders the outcome undefined such that total treatment effects in
the original study population are not defined. In this setting the term truncation by death is used
instead of competing events. Perhaps due to this limitation, there has been much more explicit
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debate in the causal inference literature regarding choices of estimand when truncation by death is
present [Pearl, 2011, Joffe, 2011, Vanderweele, 2011].
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